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  In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, local 
police across the country instituted blanket searches without 
individualized suspicion at various venues—including political 
protests, sporting events, subway platforms, and public ferries—all in 
an attempt to prevent further terrorist attacks. When evaluating these 
searches, courts rely upon the special needs doctrine, which allows the 
government to conduct a suspicionless search as long as the search 
serves a special need distinct from the goals of law enforcement. Over 
the past eight years, courts have struggled to determine whether and 
how the special needs doctrine applies to these searches, and these 
struggles have produced inconsistent results. 
  This Article first reviews the history of antiterrorism searches, 
which can be roughly divided into three different time periods. In the 
early 1970s, in response to an epidemic of hijackings and bombings of 
public buildings, the government instituted a regime of suspicionless 
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searches at airports and public buildings—searches which continue to 
this day. During the second period, the imminent danger of these 
terrorist actions abated, but courts continued to reject challenges to 
the searches, and suspicionless searches spread to other contexts far 
removed from the terrorist threat. Finally, in the third era, which 
began in 2001 and continues to the present day, the government has 
aggressively expanded its use of antiterrorism searches, and courts 
face a new set of challenges in evaluating their constitutionality. 
  This Article then explains why antiterrorism searches cannot be 
justified under the special needs doctrine, and indeed why—in their 
current form—these searches cannot be justified under any Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. It then proposes a solution: suspicionless 
searches to prevent terrorism should be permitted, but only if the 
fruits of the search cannot be used in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution. Although the solution at first seems controversial, it 
represents a reasonable balance between the need to protect the 
country from terrorist attacks and the need to draw a principled 
distinction between special needs searches and general searches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider a hypothetical. The United States is the victim of 
multiple terrorist attacks,1 and traditional law enforcement techniques 
have consistently been proven ineffective. In response, federal law 
enforcement agents institute a regime of blanket searches, conducted 
without any degree of individualized suspicion. These suspicionless 
searches work, and in a very short period of time the terrorist attacks 
abate. Meanwhile, the search regimes are inevitably subjected to a 
series of challenges in court. The judges, seeing the efficacy of these 
programs, unanimously approve of the searches by exploiting—and 
expanding—a relatively obscure loophole in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Stability returns to the nation. The question: what 
happens to the suspicionless searches once the terrorist attacks have 
been eliminated? 
 
 1. Throughout this Article, the word “terrorism” will be used to denote the use or threat 
of violence with the intent to intimidate, usually for ideological or political purposes. See 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1854 (3d ed. 1992). 
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The answer: they continue indefinitely. And why not? They have 
proven themselves effective—indeed, indispensable—in preventing 
widespread acts of violence. They have been sanctioned by the courts. 
And most importantly, every year that they continue, the citizens who 
are consistently subjected to these searches become more and more 
accustomed to them, until they no longer seem to be intrusive. 
Instead, if the searches are noticed at all, they are thought to be 
merely a minor annoyance, an inevitable facet of modern life. 
This is not a hypothetical from our potential future; it is a lesson 
from our recent past. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, international 
hijackers and domestic terrorists caused widespread violence and 
social unrest in this country. These attacks stopped only after the 
government ordered searches of every airplane passenger and every 
visitor to federal courthouses. Courts upheld these suspicionless 
searches by applying a legal theory called the administrative search 
doctrine, which had been recently developed to allow health 
inspectors access to homes without needing to demonstrate 
individualized suspicion. Now, nearly forty years later, entire 
generations have grown up assuming the only way to board an 
airplane or enter a courthouse is to be subjected to a search by law 
enforcement personnel. 
But if we are to learn a lesson from this history, it is not clear 
what the lesson should be. We have effectively traded liberty for 
security, but even now it is difficult to measure how much liberty we 
have lost and how much security we have gained. Are suspicionless 
searches at airports and public courthouses merely a minor 
annoyance, or a severe and unjustified privacy intrusion into our 
privacy made all the more Orwellian by the fact that we only perceive 
them to be a minor annoyance? And how much more secure are we 
with these searches—or rather, how much security would we lose if 
we abolished these searches and required police to play by the normal 
rules to prevent these crimes? 
Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, these are no longer 
academic questions. History is repeating itself. In the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, local police across the country instituted 
suspicionless search regimes at political protests, sporting events, 
subway platforms, and public ferries, all in an attempt to prevent 
further terrorist attacks. Courts now struggle to determine whether 
the same doctrine that justified suspicionless searches at airports and 
public courthouses can be used to support this second generation of 
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searches. And many academics—usually ready to denounce and 
criticize new restrictions on Fourth Amendment rights—have 
scrambled to find ways to justify these searches under existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence,2 or have argued that the old Fourth 
Amendment rules simply do not or should not apply in the face of a 
terrorist threat.3 
This Article evaluates the constitutionality of today’s 
antiterrorism suspicionless searches. It argues that one cannot 
effectively evaluate the validity of these searches without first 
understanding and critiquing the initial wave of antiterrorism 
suspicionless searches, all of which were unanimously approved by 
the courts in the early 1970s. Thus, this Article breaks up the 
development of antiterrorism searches into three time periods: the 
early 1970s, when courts first instituted and upheld airport and 
courthouse searches; the 1980s and 1990s, when terrorist attacks 
abated and the searches became ingrained in American culture; and 
the modern era, from 2001 until the present, in which the government 
seeks to extend the scope of the searches and courts are once again 
being called upon to evaluate their constitutionality. 
Of course, suspicionless searches are not confined to the 
antiterrorism context. In fact, just before the first antiterrorism 
searches were being reviewed by the appellate courts in the early 
1970s, the Supreme Court created an entirely new doctrine which 
 
 2. See, e.g., Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the 
Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 722 (2007) 
(stating that the New York City subway searches are “uncontroversial” and that the case for 
such searches is “relatively easy to make”); Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis 
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 131–37 (2007) 
(arguing that suspicionless searches should be seen as reasonable and thus constitutional if they 
have been approved by a representative legislative body, because the legislative process will 
correct any overreaching by law enforcement). But see Anthony C. Coveny, When the 
Immovable Object Meets the Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in the Age of Terrorism, 31 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 329, 384 (2007) (criticizing the holdings in antiterrorism search cases and 
noting that “whenever a bright line rule is replaced by a balancing test, civil liberties are likely 
to lose”). 
 3. See, e.g., Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth 
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777 (2004) (asserting that “traditional Fourth Amendment 
search-and-seizure doctrine was fine for an age of flintlocks,” but that “large-scale searches 
undertaken to prevent horrific potential harms may be constitutionally sound”). But see John T. 
Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 834–35 
(2007) (concluding that “the war on terror has generated extraordinary criminal processes 
applicable to people suspected of terrorism” and that the costs of this change are significant, 
including that “state power over all of us—over our bodies, our mobility, our words and actions, 
and of course our lives—continues to increase”). 
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allowed the government to conduct a search or seizure without any 
showing of individualized suspicion. It is this doctrine, known as the 
administrative search doctrine, which the early courts ultimately used 
to justify the antiterrorism searches. Although the Court has 
described these cases as a “closely guarded category of 
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,”4 they in fact 
cover a broad range of situations. They include searches to enforce 
regulatory violations, mandatory drug testing of schoolchildren and 
public employees, inventory searches, immigration and drunk driving 
checkpoints, and searches of probationers and parolees. The doctrine 
underlying these cases is murky at best, and judges and commentators 
disagree as to whether these cases all fall into the same category or 
should be considered doctrinally distinct.5 For now, I will refer to 
them all as “permissible suspicionless searches,” meaning searches 
that are permissible even if the government does not have any 
amount of individualized suspicion of the subject being searched. 
The first three Parts of this Article detail the changes to 
antiterrorism searches and the permissible suspicionless search 
doctrine for each of these three time periods. Part I covers the first 
era, approximately 1968–1976, and examines both the government’s 
reaction to the first wave of terrorism, as well as the birth and early 
application of the permissible suspicionless search doctrine. Part II 
describes the second era, roughly 1977–2000, which was a time of 
relative calm between the two waves of terrorism. Despite the relative 
calm during this period, the permissible suspicionless searches at 
airports and courthouses became more firmly entrenched in the law, 
and among the general public they became an unquestioned—and 
perhaps even comforting—aspect of traveling by air or entering a 
federal building. Meanwhile, outside the terrorism context, the 
permissible suspicionless search doctrine was evolving and expanding 
 
 4. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional a Georgia law 
that conditioned one’s candidacy for state office on passing a drug test). 
 5. The Ninth Circuit, for example, breaks these cases down into three categories that are 
“not necessarily mutually-exclusive”: searches at “exempted areas” (such as international 
borders, prisons, airports, and entrances to government buildings), “administrative” searches, 
and “special needs” searches. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Professor Schulhofer, meanwhile, distinguishes the “administrative” searches and the “internal 
governance” searches (such as those that occur in schools and public workplaces) from the 
mandatory drug testing laws that are actually intended to deter and punish the use of illegal 
drugs. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 162–63. 
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to cover a variety of different contexts, acquiring along the way a new 
name: special needs searches. Finally, Part III discusses the modern 
era, from 2001 to the present, when terrorism again became a 
palpable threat to this country, and law enforcement once again 
responded with suspicionless searches to prevent future attacks. 
During the present era, however, courts have become more critical of 
suspicionless searches, both in the antiterrorism context and in other 
areas, ultimately leading to a confusing legal test and an inconsistent 
application of that test when it is applied to antiterrorism searches. 
After the Article traces the development of both antiterrorism 
searches and the permissible suspicionless search doctrine, Part IV 
critically analyzes the special needs doctrine. This Part breaks the 
special needs cases up into three different categories: searches made 
outside the criminal context, searches made in the context of criminal 
activity but whose results are not turned over to law enforcement, and 
searches made in the context of a criminal case whose results are used 
by law enforcement. This Part concludes that suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches fall into the third category—a category that 
cannot be justified by the special needs doctrine. Part V examines 
other possible justifications for suspicionless antiterrorism searches, 
including analyzing these cases under a generalized reasonableness 
test and relying on implied consent. This Part concludes that no other 
justifications are valid, given the very real danger of a slippery slope 
and the need for a principled distinction between searches that 
require individualized suspicion and those that do not. This creates a 
significant problem: if suspicionless antiterrorism searches are 
unconstitutional under the principles of the Fourth Amendment, how 
can law enforcement protect us from the very real threat of 
terrorism? 
Part VI will propose a solution to this problem: suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches would be constitutionally justified under the 
special needs doctrine as long as any contraband that is recovered 
cannot be used in a criminal prosecution. By giving law enforcement 
the opportunity to choose between a suspicionless search that is truly 
aimed only at preventing terrorism and a more traditional search that 
could result in criminal prosecution, this proposal gives the police 
more power to search when there is a true terrorist threat, yet 
encourages them to develop more sophisticated and less intrusive 
methods of investigation when they are seeking to apprehend and 
prosecute wrongdoers. 
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I.  THE FIRST ERA: 1968–1976 
The government’s use of antiterrorism suspicionless searches 
began in the late 1960s, in response to a series of hijackings and 
bombings of government buildings across the country. At about the 
same time, the Supreme Court created the administrative search 
doctrine, which permitted suspicionless searches as long as they were 
not “aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime.”6 When it came 
time for courts to review the antiterrorism suspicionless searches, 
many of them turned to the administrative search doctrine to evaluate 
and ultimately approve of this method of detecting and apprehending 
terrorists. 
A. The First Wave of Terror: Hijackings and Bombings 
The late 1960s was a time of severe social unrest in this country. 
The civil rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam War, protests 
against the regime of Fidel Castro, and Palestinian claims of 
sovereignty all motivated radical elements of the population to 
engage in acts of domestic terrorism. Bombings of public buildings 
and other high-profile targets increased dramatically. Although the 
country had experienced forms of domestic terrorism before, the 
unrest had previously been limited to political fringe groups or 
specific segments of the population.7 During the late 1960s, police 
departments, courthouses, foreign missions, university offices, 
prisons, the Pentagon, and the United States capitol building were all 
targets of bomb attacks.8 According to a report by the Federal Bureau 
 
 6. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (asserting the reasonableness of code-
enforcement inspections). 
 7. For example, in 1857 a group of Mormons in Utah declared themselves to be in open 
rebellion against the United States and slaughtered 120 settlers on their way to California. See 
Eugene E. Campbell, Governmental Beginnings, in UTAH’S HISTORY 153, 165–71 (Richard D. 
Poll et al. eds., 1989). The late-nineteenth century saw a number of violent acts committed 
during labor disputes or by anarchists attempting to topple the United States government. See, 
e.g., Nicholas von Hoffman, To Kill Everyman; A New Chapter in American Terrorism, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 15, 1995, at B3 (describing the changing targets of terrorist attacks). And racial 
violence perpetrated by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan caused many deaths in the early-to-
mid-twentieth century. However horrible these terrorists’ actions were, in sheer number they 
did not compare to the widespread bombings of public buildings in the late 1960s. See infra 
notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Thomas R. Brooks, Editorial, The Radical Underground Surfaces with a Bang, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1970, (Magazine), at 171; see also Michael Taylor, ‘70s in the Bay Area—Era of 
Radical Violence, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 2007, at A1. 
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of Investigation, there were 3,000 bombings and 50,000 bomb threats 
in 1970 alone.9 These attacks, alongside a series of high-profile 
political assassinations, including Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther 
King, Jr., heightened the perception of a tidal wave of violent social 
unrest sweeping the country.10  
Around the same time, the country experienced an epidemic of 
airplane hijackings. In the decade preceding 1968, hijackings had 
averaged only one per year, but in 1968 there were eighteen, and in 
1969 there were thirty-three.11 In one particularly notorious incident 
in 1970, a radical Palestinian group hijacked four planes bound for 
New York City and flew them to Jordan and Egypt, where the 
terrorists ultimately blew up all four planes on the landing field.12 
The government’s response to this rise in both domestic and 
international terrorism included broad new search procedures at the 
entrances to public buildings and at airports. In the fall of 1970, the 
federal General Services Administration issued an order requiring 
searches of all bags and packages at entrances to every federal 
building.13 Meanwhile, on September 11, 1970, President Richard 
Nixon issued a directive for the Department of Transportation, 
requiring its agents to work with airlines to institute surveillance 
programs at all domestic airports.14 This directive was followed by a 
series of rules promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration 
in 1972 requiring all airline passengers and their luggage to be 
 
 9. See FBI, History of the FBI: Vietnam War Era: 1960s–1970s, http://www.fbi.gov/ 
libref/historic/history/vietnam.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2009) (describing violence in opposition 
to the Vietnam War). 
 10. See generally The American Century, 1960–1969, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1999, at A10 
(detailing the major political and social events of the 1960s). 
 11. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States v. 
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The high number of hijackings continued into the 
next decade: twenty-five in 1970, twenty-five in 1971, and twenty-six in 1972. The numbers 
finally dropped to single digits for most of the rest of the 1970s, and dropped to zero by the 
1990s. See OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SEC., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION 75 (2000). 
 12. See Eric Pace, Disclosure Is Made by Amman Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1970, at A1. 
The four planes were all destroyed on September 12, 1970. Id.; see also Cynthia R. Fagan, Iraq’s 
Oil for Terror; $72 Million to Palestinians, N.Y. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at 13. 
 13. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1231 (6th Cir. 1972). The Government Services 
Administration (GSA) order stated: “[B]ecause of the recent outburst of bombings and other 
acts of violence, effective at once, at all entrances to federal property under the charge and 
control of GSA, where there are guards on duty, all packages shall be inspected for bombs or 
other potentially harmful devices. Admittance should be denied to anyone who refuses to 
voluntarily submit packages for examination.” Id. 
 14. Davis, 482 F.2d at 899–900. 
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screened prior to boarding an airplane.15 These requirements have 
remained in place ever since,16 and security screenings have become a 
familiar fixture at every federal building and commercial airport in 
the country. 
The suspicionless searches were challenged almost immediately, 
and were universally upheld by the courts, which went out of their 
way to emphasize the grave risk posed by the threat of terrorism. The 
Sixth Circuit conceded that “[o]rdinarily . . . a person should not have 
his person or property subjected to a search in the absence of a 
warrant or probable cause to believe that a crime is being 
committed,”17 but also argued that, given the recent wave of violence, 
“the dangers to federal property and personnel were imminent.”18 
The court concluded that “in times of emergency[,] government may 
take reasonable steps to assure that its property and personnel are 
protected against damage, injury or destruction.”19 The Ninth Circuit 
similarly upheld suspicionless searches at a San Francisco 
courthouse.20 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the fact 
that there were “specific instances of bomb threats and bomb attacks 
directed at San Francisco police stations, Oakland police stations, and 
the Los Angeles federal building.”21 Moreover, the court noted that 
terrorists had recently kidnapped four individuals and killed a judge 
in a nearby county.22 Given this background of violence, the court 
determined that “a serious threat of violence existed at the Hall of 
Justice,” and therefore courthouse searches were a reasonable 
 
 15. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 900–02 (noting a February 1 rule requiring air carriers to 
implement a screening system, an August 1 directive requiring airlines to search the baggage 
and screen or search the person of passengers meeting a particular profile, and a December 1 
order requiring searches of all carry-on items and screening of all passengers). 
 16. In 2002, federal law enforcement agents replaced private airline employees as 
screeners. Federal Screeners Just One Component of Air Safety Net, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2002, 
at 20A. 
 17. Downing, 454 F.2d at 1232–33. 
 18. Id. at 1232. 
 19. Id. at 1233. The court also held that the searches were not very intrusive, stating that 
inspection of bags and packages was a “very minimal type of interference with personal 
freedom,” which was reasonable given the government’s need to protect itself against the 
“ruthless forces bent upon its destruction.” Id. 
 20. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 21. Id. at 900. 
 22. Id. 
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precaution to prevent further violence against the courthouse and its 
personnel.23 
Judges reacted similarly to suspicionless searches in airports.24 In 
approving the new security measures, these courts emphasized the 
extraordinary harm that was caused by terrorist attacks. The Ninth 
 
 23. Id. Legal commentators at the time expressed some concern that the government was 
overreacting, even given this background of violence. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Jesmore, The 
Courthouse Search, 21 UCLA L. REV. 797, 825 (1974) (“[Courthouse searches] are seldom 
founded upon an adequate correlation between the scope of the search procedures and the 
necessity for their implementation. . . . An ongoing emergency—a current, serious threat of 
violence—may provide the justification necessary . . . . [but t]he threat, of course, can be neither 
stale nor insignificant, and the intrusion must be limited according to the severity of the 
emergency.”). 
  The Supreme Court did not rule on any case regarding courthouse bombings or 
hijackings. However, in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the 
Court acknowledged the heightened danger of terrorism in a case in which the government 
wiretapped a suspected terrorist. The Court noted that “threats and acts of sabotage against the 
Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them. The 
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the Government and the 
necessary dependency of many conspirators upon the telephone make electronic surveillance an 
effective investigatory instrument in certain circumstances.” Id. at 311–12 (footnote omitted). 
However, the Court ultimately ruled against the prosecutor, concluding that “the Government’s 
concerns do not justify departure in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment 
requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance.” Id. at 321. 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499–501 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that 
the warrantless preboarding search of an airline passenger’s beach bag was reasonable when the 
passenger was given sufficient notice that she was free to avoid the search by leaving the line); 
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]he use of a magnetometer is a 
reasonable search despite the small number of weapons detected in the course of a large 
number of searches. The absolutely minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger’s privacy 
weighed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hijacker is able to proceed to the 
plane undetected is determinative of the reasonableness of the search.”); United States v. 
Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[C]ourts have consistently held airport security 
measures constitutionally justified as a limited and relatively insignificant intrusion of privacy 
balanced against the need to protect aircraft and its passengers.”); United States v. Davis, 482 
F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that preboarding screening of passengers and carry-on 
items for weapons or explosives is reasonable so long as the passenger can choose to avoid the 
search by not boarding the aircraft), abrogated by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 
2007) (en banc); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(“[R]easonableness does not require that officers search only those passengers who meet a 
profile or . . . who otherwise appear suspicious.”); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 
(3d Cir. 1972) (concluding that, because of the potential serious dangers of aircraft hijackings, 
the use of a magnetometer to screen airline passengers is justified by a reasonable governmental 
interest); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972) (“In view of the magnitude of 
the crime sought to be prevented[ and] the exigencies of time which clearly precluded the 
obtaining of a warrant, the use of the magnetometer is . . . a reasonable precaution.”); United 
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972) (asserting that magnetometer searches are 
justified by the minimal invasion of personal privacy and overwhelming governmental interest 
in preventing air piracy). 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
854 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:843 
 
Circuit noted that “[t]he need to prevent airline hijacking is 
unquestionably grave and urgent. The potential damage to person 
and property from such acts is enormous. The disruption of air traffic 
is severe. There is serious risk of complications in our foreign 
relations.”25 Suspicionless searches were seen as the only way to 
prevent these terrorist acts because “[l]ittle can be done to balk the 
malefactor after such material is successfully smuggled aboard, and as 
yet there is no foolproof method of confining the search to the few 
who are potential hijackers.”26 In upholding suspicionless airport 
searches, the Fifth Circuit implied that they would be temporary: 
“Certainly all citizens look forward to the day when skyjackings and 
their sequels, airport search and security measures, cease. When the 
threat of air piracy disappears the standards of reasonableness which 
we here recognize will go with it.”27 
The language of these opinions demonstrates that these 
suspicionless searches were seen as an extraordinary solution to an 
extraordinary problem. As one judge noted in 1976: “In the wake of 
unprecedented airport bombings, aircraft piracy and courtroom 
violence, the courts have approved precautionary security measures 
which cannot be reconciled with previously conceived notions of the 
citizen’s protection under the Fourth Amendment against warrantless 
intrusions without probable cause.”28 
Although courts generally agreed that these searches were 
necessary, they initially struggled to find a doctrinal justification for 
their holdings. Some courts simply applied the “unreasonable 
searches” language of the Fourth Amendment and concluded that the 
searches were reasonable given the nature of the threat and the 
relatively low level of intrusion.29 Others analogized suspicionless 
searches in airports to searches at the border, and applied a three-part 
balancing test, including the nature of the threat, the level of the 
intrusion, and the efficacy of the search in actually preventing the 
 
 25. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit also held that these 
searches have an element of implied consent: “[A]irport screening searches are valid only if they 
recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft.” Id. at 910–
11. The consent justification for these searches has recently been questioned by some courts. See 
infra notes 316–20 and accompanying text. 
 26. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910. 
 27. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1279. 
 28. Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1976). 
 29. See, e.g., Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972). 
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harm.30 Still others held that the individual being searched had given a 
sort of implied consent because he or she could always avoid the 
search by simply choosing not to board the plane or enter the 
government building.31 But most courts placed these searches into a 
recently developed category of suspicionless searches known as 
administrative searches—and this category is where they have 
remained for the subsequent four decades. 
B. The Birth of the Administrative Search Doctrine and the End of 
Individualized Suspicion 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause.”32 This pair of restrictions has led to differing interpretations as 
to how the Amendment should be applied in practice,33 which in turn 
has led to a thoroughly confusing body of jurisprudence. Courts have 
generally held that a search is unconstitutional unless it is supported 
by a warrant or probable cause,34 but they have also used the 
“reasonableness” language to support exceptions to this general rule. 
For example, courts allow brief pat-down searches for weapons on a 
showing of less than probable cause to protect an officer’s safety.35 
 
 30. See, e.g., Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275. 
 31. See, e.g., Singleton v. Comm’r, 606 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1979) (“By electing to proceed 
and board the aircraft, with advance notice of the search requirement, [the passenger] impliedly 
consented to the search.”); Davis, 482 F.2d at 910–11. The implied-consent justification was 
recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–61 (9th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). For a critique of the implied-consent justification, see infra Part V.C. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 33. See Bascuas, supra note 2, at 723–25 (explaining that the “warrant preference” 
interpretation, with certain exceptions, requires that searches and seizures be made under a 
warrant and with probable cause, whereas the “general reasonableness” interpretation requires 
only that searches and seizures be reasonable in the context of the particular case). Most 
scholars today focus on the “unreasonable” language, arguing for a broad balancing test in 
determining whether or not a given search is constitutional. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Terry 
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1118, 1120–25 (1998) 
(discussing different factors that may help to determine whether or not a search is reasonable, 
including: the scope and intrusiveness of the search, the weight of the governmental interest at 
issue, and the identity of the subject being searched). 
 34. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) 
(“Even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in the particular 
circumstances, a search ordinarily must be based on probable cause.”). 
 35. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24, 28–31 (1968) (holding that a police officer’s 
limited search of three men for weapons was reasonable because the men’s unusual conduct 
gave the officer reasonable ground to believe, in light of his experience, that the search was 
necessary to prevent harm to himself and others). 
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And if there is probable cause to make an arrest, the Supreme Court 
has held that a search of the suspect is reasonable to protect officer 
safety and preserve evidence for later use at trial.36 
In each of these cases, however, courts require some form of 
individualized suspicion (albeit short of probable cause) before the 
search can take place.37 In fact, prior to 1967, the only context in 
which the Supreme Court allowed nonconsensual suspicionless 
searches38 was at the international border, pursuant to longstanding 
and relatively noncontroversial case law.39 But all that changed in the 
case of Camara v. Municipal Court.40 
In Camara, the Court held that a health inspector was not 
required to demonstrate probable cause—nor indeed any form of 
individualized suspicion—to obtain a warrant to investigate a home.41 
According to the Court, there was no need to require individualized 
suspicion because the searches were not “aimed at the discovery of 
evidence of crime.”42 The Court also stated that a probable cause 
requirement would be impracticable because the hidden nature of 
 
 36. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 395–96 (1914) (affirming the principle that evidence found incidental to the execution 
of a legal search warrant is admissible at trial when material and properly offered in evidence 
because this evidence was not the product of an unreasonable search and seizure). 
 37. For searches incident to arrest, no further amount of individualized suspicion is 
required after the arrest is made—but of course the arrest itself is not legal unless the police 
have some amount of individualized suspicion against the suspect, and if they do not, the 
subsequent search incident to the arrest is invalid. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 
(1969). 
 38. Of course, the most common form of search used by law enforcement is the consent 
search, which does not require any amount of individualized suspicion—but does require the 
suspect to agree to be searched. See United States v. Miller, 20 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“[P]olice officers may search an area, even without probable cause or a warrant, if someone 
with adequate authority has consented to the search . . . .”); United States v. Morris, 910 F. 
Supp. 1428, 1446 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (explaining that for a consensual search to be valid, the 
consent must be voluntary, must not have been “tainted by any other Fourth Amendment 
violation,” and must not exceed the “reasonable scope” of the consent). 
 39. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (“Travelers may be so stopped in 
crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one 
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects 
which may be lawfully brought in.”); see also infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 40. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 41. Id. at 528 (overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which held that a health 
inspector could enter a home even without first obtaining a warrant). 
 42. Id. at 537. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
2010] SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS 857 
dangerous conditions in homes would prevent an inspector from 
being able to demonstrate probable cause.43 
Over the next fifteen years, the Court applied the administrative 
search doctrine in numerous regulatory contexts, approving warrants 
issued in the absence of individualized suspicion for Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration workplace inspections,44 and 
permitting warrantless inspections of certain industries that were 
closely regulated, such as liquor stores,45 sellers of firearms,46 and 
mines.47 In these cases, the Court added another rationale for 
abandoning the individualized suspicion requirement: the individuals 
and businesses engaged in these industries were fully aware of the 
pervasive regulation in their field and therefore had a reduced 
expectation of privacy.48 
Courts also applied the administrative search doctrine to a 
category of cases known as inventory searches. Police officers 
frequently take custody of personal property, either pursuant to 
criminal activity (for example, when they arrest an intoxicated driver 
and impound the car),49 or pursuant to other duties (for example, 
when they tow a car in violation of parking regulations, or find an 
abandoned bag in a public place).50 When police officers take custody 
of such property, they routinely conduct an “inventory search.” As 
the Supreme Court noted in 1976, the goals of such searches are not 
the discovery or investigation of a crime, but rather to (1) protect the 
owner’s property, (2) avoid false claims of lost or stolen property by 
the owner, and (3) protect the police from potential danger.51 Thus, 
the Court concluded that inventory searches were part of the 
 
 43. Id. The Court also noted that these types of suspicionless inspections had been 
traditionally accepted by the courts and by the general public. Id. 
 44. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
 45. Collonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). 
 46. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). 
 47. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981). 
 48. See, e.g., Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315–16. 
 49. See, e.g., People v. Trusty, 516 P.2d 423, 424 (Colo. 1973). 
 50. See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 272 N.E.2d 464, 466 (N.Y. 1971). 
 51. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378 (1976). Opperman merely confirmed the 
overwhelming conclusion of the lower courts; prior to the case, almost every state and circuit 
court that considered the question had held that inventory searches were permissible. Some 
lower courts had held that an inventory search was not technically a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, whereas some had concluded—as the Supreme Court ultimately did—that 
inventory searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 369–71 (listing 
over twenty-five state and circuit court opinions). 
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“routine, administrative caretaking” functions of the police,52 rather 
than part of its law enforcement functions, and approved inventory 
searches even in the absence of individualized suspicion.53 
In one sense, it is not surprising that some appellate courts 
turned to the administrative search doctrine when seeking to justify 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches in the early 1970s because at the 
time there was no other doctrine that specifically permitted 
suspicionless searches.54 And given the very real and immediate 
danger posed by the terrorists who were hijacking airplanes and 
blowing up public buildings in the late 1960s, the government had a 
reasonable argument that these searches served a purpose other than 
crime control: to wit, they were designed to secure the safety of 
airline passengers and government personnel.55 As the Ninth Circuit 
explained, the searches were “part of a general regulatory scheme in 
furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a 
criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime.”56 
This rationale was not surprising—and perhaps even justifiable, 
given the quasi emergency the country faced at the time. But even 
during this early stage, the use of the administrative search doctrine 
to justify antiterrorism searches was legally suspect. When juxtaposed 
against inspections for building code safety violations and routine 
cataloging of the contents of impounded vehicles, widespread 
suspicionless searches at airports and at courthouses stand out rather 
dramatically. In the first place, they are much broader in scope, 
affecting a much larger portion of the population—today, it is fair to 
say that the vast majority of the country has been subjected to a 
 
 52. Id. at 370 n.5. 
 53. Id. at 375–76; accord Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 (1987). 
 54. As noted above, some courts did not apply any doctrine at all; they merely conducted a 
reasonableness balancing test. Some courts analogized these searches to border searches, 
whereas other courts applied the doctrine of implied consent. See supra notes 29–31 and 
accompanying text. 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973) (“In this and other 
relevant respects, the airport search program is indistinguishable, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, from the warrantless screening inspection of air passengers and their luggage for plant 
pests and disease . . . .”), abrogated by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en 
banc). Although the Supreme Court has never directly reviewed the constitutionality of 
suspicionless searches at public buildings or in airports, it has cited the circuit court cases with 
approval in dicta, implying that upholding these suspicionless searches is a proper application of 
the administrative search doctrine. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 675 n.3 (1989). 
 56. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910. 
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search at an airport or a courthouse (or both). And in the second 
place, the public safety purpose, although no doubt legitimate, does 
not seem far removed from general crime control—in fact, if one 
looks at the searches from a slightly different perspective, the purpose 
seems to be indistinguishable from crime control. 
As it turns out, the problem of distinguishing between public 
safety and crime control became more severe over the next thirty 
years, as two changes occurred. First, the administrative search 
doctrine itself evolved to allow different types of searches, many of 
which are de facto crime-control searches masquerading as 
administrative searches. Second, as terrorism once again became a 
real threat to the country, law enforcement officers sought to expand 
the use of suspicionless antiterrorism searches to other contexts, and 
the courts—unlike their predecessors in the early 1970s—began to 
push back. 
II.  THE SECOND ERA: 1977–2000 
Although the danger from terrorism receded from 1977 to 2000, 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches continued—if anything, they 
became more entrenched in the law and in the public consciousness. 
At the same time, law enforcement began to use—and courts 
approved of—suspicionless searches in a number of other contexts: in 
schools, in the workplace, on probationers and parolees, and on the 
public roads. 
A. Order Is Restored 
Over the following two-and-a-half decades, the threat of 
terrorism—perceived and actual—receded from the nation’s 
concerns. The major outbreaks of violence conducted by such groups 
as the Weathermen, the Black Panthers, and Cuban exile groups 
faded into history,57 whereas hijackings were virtually eliminated by 
the end of the 1970s. But the suspicionless searches at airports and 
most public buildings remained in place, finding a new practical (if 
not doctrinal) justification in the minds of the populace and in the 
courts. Given the relative period of calm, courts could no longer 
 
 57. There were some exceptions. The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), a 
Puerto Rican Marxist terrorist group, carried out a number of bombings between 1974 and 1985. 
None of these incidents, however, provoked a national shift in law enforcement tactics. See 
Oscar Avila, Ex-Puerto Rican Radicals Work to Keep Cause Alive, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at 
A17. 
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defend these suspicionless searches as extraordinary responses to an 
“emergency” situation in which public buildings and airplanes faced 
“imminent” danger from the “ruthless forces” bent on harming the 
United States. Instead, the Supreme Court offered precisely the 
opposite argument when it gave suspicionless airport searches its 
stamp of approval (albeit in dicta) in 1989: 
  In the 15 years the [suspicionless search] program has been in 
effect, more than 9.5 billion persons have been screened, and over 
10 billion pieces of luggage have been inspected. By far the 
overwhelming majority of those persons who have been 
searched . . . have proved entirely innocent—only 42,000 firearms 
have been detected during the same period. When the 
Government’s interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a 
low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the 
scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a 
hallmark of success.58 
There is little dispute that the hijacking epidemic ended in large 
part because of the new security procedures at airports; thus, the 
Court’s emphasis on the efficacy of such a program is entirely 
sensible. No judge, commentator, or (probably) passenger would 
have considered eliminating the searches even in the year 2000, after 
a decade without any domestic passenger airplane hijackings.59 The 
thought of eliminating them in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 
2001 is practically unthinkable. Nevertheless, both the Fifth Circuit’s 
sentiment that Americans all “look forward to the day when 
skyjackings and their sequels, airport search and security measures, 
cease”60 and the promise that the relaxed standards that allow 
suspicionless airport searches will disappear “when the threat of air 
piracy disappears”61 now seem naïve at best. It is now clear that the 
“threat of air piracy” will never disappear, and thus, the security 
measures will never disappear either. But if suspicionless searches at 
airports are now a permanent fixture in American society, it is even 
more imperative that courts find a principled justification for these 
 
 58. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (citations omitted). 
 59. See OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SEC., supra note 11, at 75. There was an attempted 
hijacking of a nonpassenger airplane in 1994, when a Federal Express employee attempted to 
hijack one of the company’s planes. See JEFFREY PRICE, PRACTICAL AVIATION SECURITY: 
PREDICTING AND PREVENTING FUTURE THREATS 67 (2009). 
 60. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 61. Id. 
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searches—and as we will see,62 the need to justify these searches has 
been one of the factors that has turned the permissible suspicionless 
search doctrine into a confusing tangle of inconsistent jurisprudence. 
The policy of suspicionless searches at public buildings has also 
long outlasted the violent epidemic of bombings and shootings that 
created it. Like searches at airports, these security procedures have 
become a familiar and unquestioned part of daily life; one simply 
accepts that there is no way to enter many public buildings—to meet 
with a public official, or to attend a session of open court—without 
submitting to a search by a law enforcement official.63 But searches at 
public buildings are different from those at airports in three 
fundamental ways. First, although almost everyone traces the 
decrease in hijackings to the suspicionless search policy that was 
implemented to prevent them, the decrease in bombings and 
shootings inside public buildings can probably be traced to a number 
of different factors.64 Second, courts continue to point out that 
suspicionless searches in airports are the only effective way to prevent 
hijacking,65 whereas there may be other ways of keeping public 
buildings and courtrooms safe.66 Finally, as the events of September 
11, 2001 have shown, an airplane’s unique combination of 
vulnerability and destructive power means that a hijacking could 
potentially lead to catastrophic harm in terms of loss of life and 
property. In short, although the two types of suspicionless searches 
came into existence at the same time and were justified under similar 
theories, there is, at least from a policy perspective, a much stronger 
 
 62. See infra Part III. 
 63. The unquestioned acceptance of these searches by the general population is perhaps 
the most troubling aspect of permissible suspicionless searches. Not only does it mean that there 
is no political will to change—or even critically examine—the policy of suspicionless searches at 
airports and courthouses, but it could also ultimately mean that legally these procedures are no 
longer even considered to be searches at all. Under the test put forward in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), a government surveillance or detection procedure is not a search unless it 
violates the suspect’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). If 
suspicionless searches at airports and courthouses are generally accepted by society, it could be 
argued that they no longer violate a “reasonable expectation of privacy” because it would be 
unreasonable to believe one had the right to board an airplane without being subjected to a 
search. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment 
to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1331–35 (2002). 
 64. Most importantly, the decades since the Vietnam War have not seen anything like the 
level of social unrest that was produced by the racial tensions and antiwar protests of that era. 
See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 65. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 66. See infra note 355 and accompanying text. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
862 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:843 
 
reason for continuing one kind of search than there is for the other. 
Thus, a doctrine that permits suspicionless searches at airports need 
not also cover suspicionless searches at public buildings. 
B. Broadening the Scope of Permissible Suspicionless Searches 
During this second era, the permissible suspicionless search 
doctrine underwent an important evolution outside the context of 
antiterrorism searches. Courts expanded the doctrine into a number 
of different areas, including drug testing in schools,67 drug testing of 
public employees,68 searches of probationers,69 and drunk-driving 
checkpoints.70 But the most dramatic expansion in the law of 
permissible suspicionless searches was a change in what it meant for a 
search to have a noncriminal purpose—and this change occurred 
subtly, perhaps accidentally, without any express acknowledgement 
from the courts. As Part III demonstrates, this change had dramatic 
implications for later courts who applied the permissible suspicionless 
search doctrine in the terrorism context. 
One example of this change in the suspicionless search doctrine 
came in the administrative search context. In the 1987 case of New 
York v. Burger,71 the Supreme Court upheld the suspicionless search 
of an automobile junkyard.72 Under then-existing New York law, 
every automobile junkyard had to keep records of all the auto parts 
that came onto the premises, and submit both the records and the 
junkyard itself to inspections whenever requested by an appropriate 
state official.73 Pursuant to this law, police officers from the Auto 
Crimes Division of the New York Police Department searched 
Burger’s junkyard, copied down the vehicle identification numbers of 
some auto parts there, and later determined that the parts had come 
from stolen vehicles.74 Burger was subsequently charged and 
convicted for possession of stolen property, and he appealed the 
 
 67. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 68. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 69. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 70. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 71. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
 72. Id. at 718. 
 73. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986). The law allowed inspection by 
an agent of the Department of Motor Vehicles or by a police officer. Id. 
 74. Burger, 482 U.S. at 694–95. 
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conviction, claiming that the lack of individualized suspicion rendered 
the search unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court applied the administrative search doctrine 
and ruled that the search was not “aimed at the discovery of a 
crime”—even though it was conducted by police officers and resulted 
in a criminal prosecution.75 The Court explained that “an 
administrative scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal 
laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower;” and that this 
particular administrative scheme “serves the regulatory goals of 
seeking to ensure that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate 
businesspersons and that stolen vehicles and vehicle parts passing 
through automobile junkyards can be identified.”76 
During this same period, the Supreme Court began to approve of 
suspicionless searches in other contexts, and in each context the 
Court moved toward a weakening of the “noncriminal purpose” 
requirement. Specifically, the Court approved of four new categories 
of suspicionless searches: drug tests in public schools, drug tests of 
public employees, searches of probationers and parolees, and 
vehicular checkpoints. In broadening the scope of suspicionless 
searches, the Court refined its terminology, moving from 
“administrative search” to the broader term of “special needs 
search.” 
1. The Birth of Special Needs: Searches and Drug Tests in 
Schools.  The term special needs was first coined in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.,77 in which a high school assistant principal searched the purse 
of a student whom he suspected of smoking in school.78 Although the 
principal had neither a warrant nor probable cause, the Court upheld 
the search for two reasons: first, the search was conducted for the 
purpose of “maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school 
grounds,”79 not law enforcement purposes; and second, high school 
students have a “lesser expectation of privacy” than the general 
 
 75. In applying the administrative search doctrine, the Supreme Court found that the 
defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy because he was in a closely regulated industry, 
id. at 703–07, and because suspicionless searches were necessary to further a substantial interest 
of the state, id. at 708–10. The Court also noted that the statute provided notice, which was a 
valid substitute for a warrant, and that it placed legitimate time, place, and scope restrictions on 
the searches. Id. at 711–12. 
 76. Id. at 713–14 (emphasis added). 
 77. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 78. Id. at 336. 
 79. Id. at 339. 
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population.80 In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun set out a test that 
would be used in future cases: a lower standard for searches was 
permitted “only in those exceptional circumstances in which special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.”81 
In contrast with the administrative search cases, the special needs 
test does not involve any explicit finding that the government 
possessed no other viable means of meeting its objective. Blackmun’s 
test, however, incorporates (and dilutes) this standard by stating that 
the traditional requirements of the Fourth Amendment can only be 
loosened if the special needs make adherence to those requirements 
“impracticable.”82 In the context of a search conducted by school 
officials, the majority in T.L.O. stated that “[t]he warrant 
requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment” because it 
“would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and 
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”83 
This first special needs case was not a suspicionless search 
because the assistant principal had some reason to believe the 
defendant was carrying contraband in her purse. Thus, the special 
needs doctrine initially only meant that a court would relax the strict 
warrant and probable cause requirements if there were special needs 
beyond the normal needs of law enforcement.84 In T.L.O., for 
example, the Court held that the school officials must have 
“reasonable grounds” to believe the student had broken a law or a 
school rule.85 
But this requirement of individualized suspicion for searches of 
public school students was abandoned ten years later in Vernonia v. 
Acton,86 in which the Court upheld mandatory, suspicionless drug 
 
 80. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 82. See id. at 340 (majority opinion) (“The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited 
to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child 
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with 
the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). 
 85. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42. 
 86. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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testing of school athletes.87 As in T.L.O., the Court in Acton 
emphasized that schoolchildren had a “lesser expectation of 
privacy.”88 And the Court found other factors—not present in 
T.L.O.—which would logically lead to a further loosening of the 
Fourth Amendment standards: athletes in particular have a lower 
expectation of privacy than other students;89 a urinalysis is in some 
ways more limited and less intrusive than the search of a purse;90 the 
results of the tests were revealed only to school administrators and 
parents, not to law enforcement;91 and alternate methods of deterring 
drug use were likely to be less effective.92 Unfortunately, the Court 
did not explain which of these factors justified the critical doctrinal 
shift from T.L.O.’s requirement of “reasonable grounds” to Acton’s 
abandonment of individualized suspicion.93 
At first glance, abandoning the requirement of individualized 
suspicion was the most significant part of the Acton opinion. But as 
this Article demonstrates, suspicionless searches had already been 
allowed in the context of administrative searches, so this was not an 
unprecedented step.94 In truth, the most significant aspect of Acton 
was the specific special need that the Court used to justify deviation 
from the strict Fourth Amendment requirements in the first place. 
Unlike the special need in T.L.O. (maintaining discipline in the 
classroom and on school grounds), Acton’s special need was barely 
distinguishable from a standard law enforcement purpose: 
“[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren.”95 
In the Acton case, however, the Court could still legitimately 
claim that the test was not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law 
enforcement because the results of the test were not turned over to 
law enforcement personnel.96 Since Acton, this expansive definition of 
 
 87. Id. at 663–64. 
 88. Id. at 655–57. 
 89. See id. at 657. 
 90. See id. at 658. 
 91. Id. at 651, 658. 
 92. See id. at 663–64. 
 93. One can conclude by inference that the “reduced expectation of privacy” of athletes 
was not one of the dispositive factors, because seven years later the Court approved 
suspicionless drug testing of all students involved in extracurricular activities. See Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002). 
 94. Suspicionless searches had also already been permitted in the context of automotive 
checkpoints. See infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text. 
 95. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661. 
 96. Id. at 658. 
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special needs has broadened to other cases in which the results of the 
search are turned over to law enforcement,97 thus effectively removing 
the original justification for departing from the Fourth Amendment’s 
traditional requirement of individualized suspicion. 
2. Searches and Drug Tests of Public Employees.  Only one year 
after T.L.O. was decided, a plurality of the Court applied the special 
needs test in O’Connor v. Ortega,98 in effect upholding a search of a 
public hospital employee’s desk.99 As in T.L.O., the reason underlying 
the intrusion was not the normal need of law enforcement, but rather 
“the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient 
operation of the workplace;”100 thus, the search was not impermissible 
even though there was no warrant and no probable cause. 
Ortega’s analysis was similar to T.L.O.’s in many ways. The 
Court stated that a warrant or probable cause requirement would be 
impracticable in the context of the public workplace because the 
supervisors who conduct these searches—like school administrators—
“are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal 
laws,” and therefore could not be expected to understand or comply 
with “unwieldy warrant procedures”101 or “the subtleties of the 
probable cause standard.”102 Also, just like the schoolchildren in 
T.L.O. and the heavily regulated businesses in Camara, the Court 
noted that office workers have a diminished expectation of privacy in 
 
 97. See infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 98. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 99. Cf. id. at 722 (“In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the 
employer wished to enter an employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose 
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. 
Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise 
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.”). 
 100. Id. at 720; see also id. at 723 (“Government agencies provide myriad services to the 
public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable 
cause before they entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office 
correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the 
criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file 
for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a 
routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. To 
ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be 
given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 101. Id. at 722. 
 102. Id. at 724–25. 
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their workplace.103 And unsurprisingly, the Court ordered the district 
court to apply the same standard to evaluate the search: whether the 
government had “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the search 
would turn up evidence of wrongdoing.104 
And like T.L.O., Ortega laid the groundwork for future cases in 
which the Court abandoned the individualized suspicion requirement 
for public employees. In a pair of cases in 1989, the Court upheld 
suspicionless mandatory drug tests for railroad employees who had 
been involved in accidents105 and customs agents who used firearms or 
engaged in drug interdiction.106 In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n,107 the Court determined that the purpose of drug 
tests for railroad employees was “ensuring the safety of the traveling 
public and of the employees themselves,”108 noting that the tests were 
administered “not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but 
rather to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that 
result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.”109 In 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,110 the Court held 
that the purpose of drug tests for United States Customs agents was 
“to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive 
positions within the [Customs] Service and to prevent the promotion 
of drug users to those positions.”111 Specifically, the Court noted that 
the Customs Service sought to prevent employees with guns from 
injuring themselves or others, and to ensure that those protecting the 
nation’s borders maintained good judgment and were not vulnerable 
to blackmail.112 
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court cited the familiar 
justifications for allowing suspicionless searches: a limited intrusion 
 
 103. Id. at 717 (“An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other 
employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually 
entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences, 
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices 
that others—such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public—
may have frequent access to an individual’s office.”). 
 104. Id. at 726. 
 105. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989). 
 106. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–61 (1989). 
 107. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 108. Id. at 621. 
 109. Id. at 620–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 111. Id. at 666. 
 112. See id. at 670–71. 
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on privacy,113 reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the 
subjects,114 and the fact that imposing a warrant requirement would be 
impractical and would frustrate the government purpose.115 But most 
significantly, Skinner and Von Raab paralleled the evolution of 
special needs that would later be seen in Acton: in both Skinner and 
Von Raab, the purpose of the drug test was essentially to deter illegal 
activity (drug use), with the dubious argument that deterring illegal 
activity went beyond the standard goals of law enforcement because 
of the highly dangerous or sensitive positions that the employees 
occupied.116 As with Acton, the Court in Skinner and Von Raab could 
credibly claim that the test was not meant to serve the ordinary goals 
of law enforcement because the results of the drug tests were not 
turned over to the police117—but as in Acton, the Court did not 
expressly state that this restraint on the part of the state was a 
necessary element in determining that the search was conducted for a 
special need. 
3. Searches of Probationers and Parolees.  In the same year that 
Ortega was decided, the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin118 found a 
special need justifying the search of a probationer’s home.119 Again, 
the search was conducted without a warrant or probable cause, and 
again, the Court upheld the search for two reasons: first, because of 
the lower level of Fourth Amendment protection due to 
 
 113. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2. 
 114. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 (finding a diminished expectation of privacy due to the 
heavy regulation of the industry); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 (ruling that customs agents should 
expect inquiries into their fitness to perform their job). 
 115. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623–24, 628 (noting that drug users sometimes show no 
outward signs giving rise to probable cause; further noting that private railway employers are 
not experts in the warrant requirements or the subtleties of the law on probable cause); Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. at 666–67 (holding that a warrant requirement would “divert valuable agency 
resources from the Service’s primary mission”). 
 116. The greater danger posed regarding drug use by schoolchildren, railway operators, and 
customs agents is an important factor: a few years later, the Court found there was no special 
need to justify a Georgia law that required drug testing of all candidates for elected office 
because the officials did not “perform high risk, safety-sensitive tasks.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 
U.S. 305, 321–22 (1997). 
 117. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5 (noting that although the results of the test could be 
turned over to law enforcement, there was no evidence that the public employer had ever done 
so, nor that it ever intended to do so); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (“Test results may not be used 
in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s consent.”). 
 118. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
 119. Id. at 872–74. 
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probationers;120 and second, because the goal of the search was not 
law enforcement, but instead ensuring “that the probation serves as a 
period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not 
harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”121 
And what of the third factor cited in previous special needs 
cases—that requiring individualized suspicion was infeasible? In past 
special needs cases such as T.L.O. and Ortega, the Court relied on 
this factor, noting that it was impracticable for teachers, school 
administrators, or public agency supervisors to learn and understand 
the complexities of the warrant requirement and probable cause.122 
But in Griffin, this factor was whittled down more or less into 
oblivion because there is no real argument that probation officers 
cannot understand and apply the warrant or probable cause 
standards. The best the Court could do was to explain that the 
government interest might be “unduly disrupted by a requirement of 
probable cause,”123 because “so long as [the probationer’s] illegal (and 
perhaps socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently concealed as 
to give rise to no more than reasonable suspicion, they would go 
undetected and uncorrected.”124 This statement is equally true in the 
traditional law enforcement context; thus, it provides no extra 
ammunition for the argument that a lesser Fourth Amendment 
standard should apply.125 
The Griffin Court required the government to show “reasonable 
grounds” before searching a probationer’s home, but as with public 
schoolchildren and public employees, the Court eventually began 
allowing these searches without any showing of individualized 
suspicion at all.126 As this shift occurred, however, searches of 
 
 120. See id. at 874 (noting that probationers and parolees “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty 
to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on 
observance of special [probation] restrictions’” (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))). 
 121. Id. at 875. 
 122. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720, 722 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 352–53 (1985). 
 123. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878. 
 124. Id. 
 125. The Griffin Court also added another consideration, unique to the probationer context: 
that the ongoing, supervisory relationship between the probation officer and the probationer 
would provide extra information to the probation officer in deciding whether to conduct a 
search. Id. at 879. 
 126. The latest product of this evolution is Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), 
discussed infra at note 133. 
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probationers and parolees slowly left the orbit of the special needs 
category. A series of circuit court cases in the early 2000s focused on 
mandatory DNA extraction from prison inmates, parolees, and 
probationers, and these cases made it clear that the primary 
consideration in analyzing these searches was the subjects’ 
dramatically reduced expectation of privacy rather than the purpose 
of the search. Numerous circuits struggled to find a way to 
characterize the purpose of taking DNA samples as a “special need 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,”127 which turned out to 
be a logically impossible task because the DNA database being 
assembled was used for traditional law enforcement purposes. Other 
circuits abandoned the special needs test altogether and simply 
applied a “totality of the circumstances” test, allowing the DNA 
extraction because of the subjects’ substantially diminished 
expectation of privacy.128 
Finally, in 2001 the Supreme Court itself abandoned the special 
needs requirement for searches of probationers in United States v. 
Knights.129 At issue was a probationary condition that allowed the 
authorities to search the probationer’s home at any time.130 The Court 
acknowledged that the breadth of the probationary condition meant 
that a search could be conducted for any purpose, including a law 
enforcement purpose,131 and so the special needs doctrine could not 
justify the condition. The Court cited Griffin, however, for the 
proposition that a probationer’s expectation of privacy was very 
 
 127. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005); see also id. at 669 (upholding DNA 
collection from certain convicted felons because “[a]lthough the DNA samples may eventually 
help law enforcement identify the perpetrator of a crime,” they are not being used for evidence 
or investigations “at the time of collection”), overruled in part by Samson, 547 U.S. 843, as stated 
in United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n.5 (2007); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677, 679 
(7th Cir. 2004) (upholding DNA collection from prisoners because “the government has a 
special need in obtaining identity DNA samples”). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding DNA 
sample of probationers as a reasonable search under the totality of the circumstances); Padgett 
v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005) (same for prisoners); Groceman v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (probationers); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (prisoners); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (same). 
 129. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 130. Id. at 114. 
 131. Id. at 116. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
2010] SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS 871 
low,132 and thus the search was reasonable, given the strong 
government interest in monitoring its probationers.133  
4. Vehicular Checkpoints.  Suspicionless stops at vehicular 
checkpoints have a long history. Even before the special needs 
doctrine was articulated in T.L.O., the Court had extended the 
administrative search doctrine of Camara134 into the automotive 
checkpoint context. 
The first automotive checkpoint cases involved immigration 
stops. As noted above, the legal authority to conduct these stops at 
the border has been well established for nearly one hundred years.135 
Similarly, international mail is subject to suspicionless searches by 
customs officials,136 and even files on laptop computers can be opened 
and read during customs searches without individualized suspicion.137 
As a circuit court explained, border searches are conducted “for the 
purposes of collecting duties and intercepting contraband destined for 
the interior of the United States.”138 
After Camara in 1967, however, the Court began to use the 
administrative search doctrine to expand the scope of border searches 
to include seizures that were nowhere near the border. In 1975, the 
Court stated that the warrant and probable cause requirement did not 
apply to roving patrols inside the border.139 One year later, in United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte,140 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
suspicionless immigration checkpoint that took place nearly sixty 
miles inside the border.141 The Court relied on Camara and its 
progeny for the principle that, although “individualized suspicion is 
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure . . . . the 
 
 132. Id. at 119. 
 133. Id. at 120–21. In a case five years later, the Court similarly ignored the special needs 
test in upholding a California law that allowed parolees to be subject to suspicionless searches. 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 855 n.4 (2006). 
 134. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 622 (1977); United States v. Seljan, 547 
F.3d 993, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 137. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 138. United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 139. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975) (stating in dictum that law 
enforcement officers in border areas could pull over cars based on less than probable cause, but 
stating that there must be some individualized reasonable suspicion). 
 140. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 141. Id. at 566–67. 
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Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such 
suspicion.”142 
The Court justified the lower Fourth Amendment standard on 
numerous grounds. One was the low level of intrusion involved in the 
stop—a brief detention, a few questions, the production of 
documents, and a visual inspection of the car.143 Another justification 
was the diminished expectation of privacy possessed by individuals in 
automobiles.144 But these rationales alone were not sufficient to justify 
suspicionless stops, so in an attempt to tie the automotive checkpoint 
cases to the administrative search doctrine, the Court also 
emphasized two other aspects of the case: the necessity of these 
techniques to prevent the influx of illegal aliens (a flow that “cannot 
be controlled effectively at the border”);145 and a non–law 
enforcement purpose, which it described as the public interest in 
denying illegal aliens “a quick and safe route into the interior.”146 
The Court later upheld vehicular checkpoints for the purposes of 
detecting and apprehending drunk drivers. In that case, Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz,147 the Court rejected the special 
needs test and instead applied a balancing test from other seizure 
cases.148 Because the danger posed to public safety by drunk drivers 
was so great, and the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights by the 
stops was so slight, the Court concluded that the checkpoints were 
reasonable.149 
As with the suspicionless searches in Burger, Skinner, Von Raab, 
and Acton, there is a fine line between vehicular checkpoints 
designed for general crime control and those designed to meet a 
special need or a distinct public interest. By the year 2000, the 
suspicionless search doctrine had evolved from covering a narrowly 
defined group of cases involving truly routine and administrative 
procedures to covering a wide range of searches that revealed 
 
 142. Id. at 560–61. 
 143. Id. at 558. 
 144. Id. at 561; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (claiming a 
“diminished expectation of privacy” with regard to vehicles). 
 145. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. at 556. 
 146. Id. at 557. 
 147. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 148. Id. at 455. The Court relied most prominently on Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448–50, 453–54. 
 149. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449–52. 
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evidence of criminal activity—though the doctrine’s approval rested 
on whether the purpose of the search was something other than 
detecting criminal activity.150 As a result, by the end of the second era, 
antiterrorism suspicionless searches at airports and courthouses no 
longer seemed out of place as an administrative or special needs 
search—the doctrine had effectively caught up with the reality of 
antiterrorism searches. 
But in this final period, during the second wave of terrorist 
attacks, the government began overstepping its bounds, and courts 
began to resist applying the special needs doctrine to suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches. At the same time, the Supreme Court began 
to limit the application of the special needs doctrine in other contexts, 
further complicating the doctrinal justification for antiterrorist 
searches. 
III.  THE THIRD ERA: 2001–2010 
The fight against terrorism has been one of the defining 
characteristics of this decade. In response to the devastating attacks of 
September 11 and subsequent attacks in Europe, the United States 
government instituted a number of aggressive law enforcement 
initiatives to prevent future terrorist attacks. Among these initiatives 
was a sweeping expansion of antiterrorism suspicionless searches, 
which were instituted near potential terrorist targets such as 
reservoirs, political protests, sports arenas, and public transportation. 
At the same time, however, courts finally began to limit and restrict 
the use of suspicionless searches, both inside and outside the context 
of terrorism. 
A. The War on Terror 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 Americans 
in a single day.151 They were followed by similar attacks on civilians 
throughout Europe, including the 2004 bombing of four commuter 
trains in Madrid, which killed 191 people and injured nearly 2,000 
 
 150. In fact, the antiterrorism searches provided some authority for this shift because a 
number of cases that expanded the scope of suspicionless searches cited the earlier courts’ 
unanimous approval of airport and courthouse searches as evidence that public safety was a 
legitimate special need, distinct from general crime control. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989). 
 151. Sean Alfano, War Casualties Pass 9/11 Death Toll, CBS NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/22/terror/main2035427.shtml. 
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more,152 and the 2005 bombing of three subway trains in London, 
which killed 52 people and injured over 700.153 
The threat of terrorist attacks, and the resulting “war on terror,” 
have been two of the defining characteristics of this decade.154 Unlike 
the late 1960s, when the country faced hundreds of small-scale acts of 
violence as a result of widespread social unrest, the war on terror in 
the 2000s is primarily defined by the devastating attacks on a single 
day in 2001.155 But the popular sentiment and the government reaction 
has otherwise been similar, and just like in the early 1970s, the 
government has responded to the terrorist threat with aggressive law 
enforcement techniques, many of which have restricted civil 
liberties.156 The most dramatic responses—the USA PATRIOT Act, 
indefinite detention at Guantánamo Bay, warrantless wiretapping, 
and enhanced interrogation techniques—have been subject to 
significant public criticism,157 and most have subsequently been 
repudiated by the Supreme Court or reversed by the Obama 
administration.158 
 
 152. Sean Clarke, Major Terrorist Attacks Since 9/11, GUARDIAN, Jul. 7, 2005, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/07/terrorism.uk1. 
 153. Attack on London, GUARDIAN, July 7, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,,15388 
19,00.html. 
 154. Terrorism did not even register as an election issue in 2000, but in 2002 it was seen as 
the second-most important challenge for the government to address. See Economy Now the 
Most Important Issue for Americans by a Wide Margin, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, Sept. 24, 2008, 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=951 (showing that, of people 
surveyed in 2002, 17 percent offered unprompted replies of “terrorism” as an election issue, 
making it the second most common unprompted answer). 
 155. There have been a series of threats and even fatalities since then, such as an individual 
who attempted to board a passenger airplane with a bomb in his shoe, see Shoe Bomb Suspect to 
Remain in Custody, CNN.COM, Dec. 25, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/24/ 
investigation.plane/index.html, and an unidentified person who sent Anthrax through the mail, 
see FBI, Amerithrax Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2010). 
 156. For an overview and analysis of many of these responses, see Parry, supra note 3, at 
770–82. 
 157. See, e.g., Cate Doty, Gore Criticizes Expanded Terrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2003, at A1 (criticizing expanded security measures). 
 158. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (ruling that the Bush 
administration’s tribunals trying enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay were 
unconstitutional); Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, Obama Reverses Key Bush 
Security Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1 (“Mr. Obama signed executive orders closing 
the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within a year; ending the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s secret prisons; and requiring all interrogations to follow the noncoercive methods of 
the Army Field Manual.”). 
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One of the less publicized reactions to this second wave of 
terrorism has been local law enforcement’s increasing use of 
suspicionless searches in new contexts. Local police have conducted 
suspicionless searches at subway entrances,159 on ferries,160 near the 
Republican and Democratic conventions,161 near reservoirs,162 at 
protest rallies,163 at hockey arenas,164 and at football stadiums.165 Courts 
have analogized these cases to the suspicionless antiterrorism 
searches from the past era, applying the administrative search 
doctrine to determine whether the search was permissible. But unlike 
the searches in airports and public buildings that comprised the first 
wave of antiterrorism suspicionless searches, these searches have not 
been met with unanimous approval by the courts. 
1. Reservoirs.  The opening act in this second stage of 
antiterrorism searches occurred one month after the September 11 
attacks, in the middle of the night on a small country road near the 
Cobble Mountain Reservoir in Blandville, Massachusetts.166 The 
Cobble Mountain Reservoir supplies water to a number of towns and 
cities in Massachusetts, and in the wake of the September 11 attacks, 
the state police were concerned that a terrorist might try to 
contaminate the water supply or destroy the dam itself.167 Troopers 
were stationed on the Cobble Mountain Road, which runs along the 
length of the reservoir, with orders to stop all vehicles that travelled 
along the road and speak to the drivers.168 
The officers stopped David Carkhuff and immediately noticed 
that he was intoxicated, and then arrested him for driving under the 
influence.169 Carkhuff challenged the constitutionality of the stop, 
 
 159. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 160. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 161. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 162. Commonwealth v. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d 317, 318 (Mass. 2004); see also infra Part 
III.A.1. 
 163. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004); see also infra Part III.A.2. 
 164. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 2005); see also infra Part III.A.3. 
 165. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–60 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d 
per curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also infra Part III.A.3. 
 166. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d at 318. 
 167. Id. at 318–19. 
 168. Id. The troopers also had orders to conduct a search of every truck that drove down the 
road. Id. 
 169. Id. at 319. 
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noting that the troopers had no reason to suspect him of having 
committed any crime at the time he was ordered to stop.170 The state 
urged the court to apply the special needs doctrine, arguing that the 
troopers’ policy of suspicionless stops was analogous to the well-
established searches at airports and public buildings.171 As the state 
noted, “the search and seizure protocols at those facilities,” like the 
seizure protocol near the reservoir, are not designed for a law 
enforcement purpose, but rather “to assure that persons entering do 
not have the means to destroy those facilities or to disrupt their 
operation.”172 
But the Massachusetts Supreme Court disagreed. The court held 
that the purpose of the search crossed the line from protecting public 
safety to straightforward law enforcement, and thus the state 
troopers’ actions did not meet the requirements of an administrative 
search.173 The court based this conclusion on the lack of notice given 
to the defendant, noting that in the case of searches at airports and 
public buildings, the individual receives prior notice that the search 
will occur.174 This allows the individual to avoid the search altogether 
by “electing not to board the aircraft (or enter the court house).”175 
Giving prior notice reinforces the argument that the purpose of the 
search is to protect the vulnerable facility rather than to detect and 
apprehend criminals because “the objective of preventing dangerous 
persons from gaining access is still accomplished” if a terrorist simply 
avoids the facility altogether.176 
2. Political Protests.  One year after Carkhuff was illegally 
searched near the Cobble Mountain Resevoir, another antiterrorism 
suspicionless search took place outside a military base in Columbus, 
Georgia. A protest group was planning its annual demonstration 
outside of Fort Benning,177 and the city of Columbus instituted a new 
 
 170. Id. at 318. 
 171. Id. at 320. 
 172. Id. The state also used analogies to cases upholding searches at the entrances to 
military bases. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 480 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 
 173. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d at 320. 
 174. Id. at 322–23. 
 175. Id. at 322. 
 176. Id. at 323. 
 177. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004). Fort Benning was the host of 
the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, otherwise known as the “School of 
the Americas,” which trains military leaders from other Western Hemisphere countries in 
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policy requiring every participant in the protest to submit to a search 
prior to proceeding to the protest site.178 The city argued in its brief 
that the September 11 attacks had—or at least should have—
fundamentally changed the rules for antiterrorism suspicionless 
searches, stating that “[l]ocal governments need an opinion that, 
without question, allows [suspicionless] non-discriminatory, low-level 
magnetometer searches at large gatherings.”179 
The Eleventh Circuit refused to give the city such an opinion. In 
Bourgeois v. Peters,180 the court found the city’s argument “troubling” 
because “the threat of terrorism . . . cannot [be] use[d] . . . as the basis 
for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections in 
any large gathering of people.”181 If a generalized threat of terrorism 
were sufficient to justify mass suspicionless searches, law enforcement 
could institute these searches for any large event, including “a high 
school graduation, a church picnic, a public concert in the park, an art 
festival, a Fourth of July parade, sporting events such as a marathon, 
and fund-raising events such as the annual breast cancer walk.”182 
Like the state of Massachusetts, the city of Columbus invoked 
the special needs doctrine, arguing that the purpose of searching the 
protesters was not to detect crime or enforce the criminal law, but 
instead to “ensure the safety of participants, spectators, and law 
enforcement.”183 The Bourgeois court rejected this argument, ruling 
that the goals of public safety and law enforcement were “inextricably 
intertwined” in this context.184 The difference is no more than 
semantic, according to the court; under the city’s argument, “a search 
intended to enforce a given law would be permissible so long as the 
government officially maintained that its purpose was to secure the 
 
counterinsurgency tactics. Id. The protest group, known as the School of the Americas Watch 
(SAW), had conducted a peaceful protest of approximately 15,000 people every year for the 
thirteen years prior to the events in this case. Id. 
 178. The search was essentially identical to an airport screening—every protester was 
required to walk through a metal detector, and if the detector indicated the presence of metal, 
the police would conduct a more thorough search of the protestor’s person and possessions. Id. 
at 1307. 
 179. Id. at 1311 (quoting Brief of Appellees at 13, Bourgeois, 387 F.3d 1303 (No. 02-16886), 
2003 WL 23960109). 
 180. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 181. Id. at 1311. 
 182. Id. (quoting Reply Brief of Appellants at 4, Bourgeois, 387 F.3d 1303 (No. 02-16886), 
2003 WL 23960108). 
 183. Id. at 1312 (quoting Brief of Appellees, supra note 179, at 11). 
 184. Id. at 1312–13. 
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objectives that motivated the law’s enactment in the first place (e.g., 
public safety) rather than simply to enforce the law for its own 
sake.”185 
But the Bourgeois court did not explain why this argument 
should apply to searches at political protests and not to searches at 
airports and public buildings, which are also searches intended to 
detect criminal activity that are justified on the grounds that they 
protect public safety. Indeed, the Bourgeois court—somewhat 
inexplicably—does not mention the airport and public buildings cases 
at all. Thus, the court does not provide any principled way to 
distinguish between antiterrorism suspicionless searches at airports 
and public buildings (which courts have consistently held to be 
permissible) and antiterrorism suspicionless searches at political 
protests (which the court held were impermissible).186 
Two years later, in preparation for the Republican National 
Convention of 2004, New York City attempted to institute its own 
suspicionless search policy for political protesters. To enhance 
security during the convention, the New York City Police 
Department (N.Y.P.D.) planned to search the bags of every protestor 
before allowing them to proceed to the demonstration site.187 In 
Stauber v. City of New York,188 the protestors challenged this policy 
and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the police from 
conducting these searches.189 Once again, the defendant invoked the 
special needs doctrine, citing the cases upholding suspicionless 
searches at airports.190 And once again, the court rejected this 
argument.191 
But unlike the Bourgeois court, the judge in Stauber addressed 
the airport cases directly, and distinguished them from searches at 
 
 185. Id. at 1313. 
 186. The Bourgeois court did note in the facts that the demonstrations had been peaceful for 
thirteen years, with no weapons ever found and no arrests for violence, id. at 1306, but it did not 
refer back to these facts during its legal analysis. 
 187. Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004). The N.Y.P.D. also announced a number of 
other security measures, such as requiring demonstrators to assemble within “pens” that were 
made up of metal barricades and restricting access to the sites of the demonstration. Id. at *2–3. 
 188. Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13350 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004). 
 189. Id. at *1. 
 190. Id. at *84–87. 
 191. Id. at *84–90. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
2010] SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS 879 
protest sites. According to the court, the primary difference between 
the two cases was the nature of the security threat: for the New York 
City protestors, the threat was “overly vague”: the defendant had 
only shown that the United States government “considers the 
Convention to be a potential terrorism target,”192 and a “general 
invocation of terrorist threats” was not sufficient to justify the search 
program.193 In contrast, searches at airports were “implemented in 
response to specific information about the threats faced by 
officials;”194 thus, the threat was real and concrete, and law 
enforcement was allowed to respond accordingly.195 
3. Sports Arenas.  A year earlier, the issue of suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches arose in yet another context: a college hockey 
game between the University of North Dakota and the University of 
Minnesota in Grand Forks, North Dakota.196 For security reasons, 
University police officers at the entrances to the game subjected 
every student to a pat-down search before entering the arena.197 When 
the police searched Scott Seglen, an underage student, they detected 
and recovered a can of Coors Light in his pocket.198 Seglen challenged 
the constitutionality of the search, and the state analogized the search 
to suspicionless searches at airports and public buildings, arguing that 
such searches were even more reasonable in the wake of the attacks 
of September 11.199 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also rejected this analogy, 
citing Bourgeois, and held that the suspicionless searches were 
unconstitutional.200 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Bourgeois, 
 
 192. Id. at *88. 
 193. Id. at *89. 
 194. Id. at *88–89. 
 195. The court also noted other significant differences between airport searches and 
protestor searches: (1) the searches at airports involve (as a first step) only metal detectors, 
which are less intrusive than bag searches; (2) airport searches do not affect a person’s 
constitutional right to expression; and (3) the police department gives no advance notice as to 
whether they will be searching at a particular demonstration. Id. at *84–88. 
 196. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005). 
 197. Id. at 705. One of the original justifications for the search was to prevent students from 
carrying animal carcasses into the arena and then throwing them on the ice during the game. Id. 
at 705. During the court case, however, the state argued for broader “security needs” that are 
“similar to airports and courthouses, especially in recent years.” Id. at 707. 
 198. Id. at 705. 
 199. Id. at 707–08. 
 200. Id. at 708. 
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however, the court in State v. Seglen201 did provide one hint as to why 
searches at hockey arenas should be treated differently than searches 
at airports and public buildings—and its reasoning was similar to that 
of the judge in Stauber. The court noted that airport and public 
building searches were held to be constitutional only after 
“unprecedented airport bombings, aircraft piracy, and courtroom 
violence;”202 in contrast, there was “no history of injury or violence 
presented” in the Seglen case.203 Whether a history of injury and 
violence at sports arenas would actually have changed the outcome of 
the case—and if so, what level of history of injury and violence would 
be required—was left unexplained. 
The next court to hear a suspicionless search case at a sporting 
event was even more explicit in its reasoning. In Johnston v. Tampa 
Sports Authority,204 a federal district court judge ruled that 
suspicionless searches of fans entering a professional football stadium 
were unconstitutional. The court applied a special needs analysis, and 
(unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Bourgeois), did not dispute the fact 
that ensuring public safety could be a special need distinct from law 
enforcement purposes.205 But the court then followed the reasoning of 
the Stauber court, explicitly stating that for an antiterrorism 
suspicionless search to be constitutional, the danger of a terrorist 
attack must be a “concrete danger”—that is, a “substantial and real” 
danger, not merely a generalized risk.206 In the case of Tampa Bay 
stadium, the Johnston court concluded that “there was no testimony 
or evidence of a particularized threat to NFL games or to the 
[Tampa] stadium,”207 merely a “general threat that terrorists might 
attack any venue where a large number of Americans gather.”208 
 
 201. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005). 
 202. Id. at 707. 
 203. Id. at 708. 
 204. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d per 
curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam). 
 205. Id. at 1265–66. The judge in Johnston was worried about the slippery slope that would 
be created if no such principled distinction were drawn. Echoing Bourgeois, the court noted that 
allowing special needs to justify any antiterrorism suspicionless search would lead to searches at 
“virtually all professional sporting events, high school graduations, indoor and outdoor concerts, 
and parades.” Id. at 1269. 
 206. Id. at 1266. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1268. 
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4. Public Transportation.  The final skirmish in the second wave 
of suspicionless antiterrorism searches involved public transportation. 
The first case, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,209 arose from searches 
that took place on the buses and subway trains of Boston in July of 
2004. As part of enhanced security during the Democratic National 
Convention, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
(MBTA) conducted suspicionless searches of all individuals riding 
buses or trains that passed near the convention site.210 When some bus 
riders sought an injunction against the searches, the MBTA 
responded with the now-familiar argument: these were merely 
“administrative” searches “similar to the security inspections of 
personal belongings conducted at airports and the entryways to 
certain kinds of property, such as courthouses.”211 But this time the 
argument won the day. Pointing to the then-recent subway bombings 
in Madrid and Moscow, the trial judge noted that “it is not without 
foundation to worry that a terrorist event might be aimed 
simultaneously at the convention and the transit system.”212 The judge 
was not bothered by the lack of a specific threat against the 
Democratic Convention, noting that “there is also no reason to 
believe that specific information is necessarily, or even frequently, 
available before a terrorist attack,”213 and that airport searches take 
place in the “absence of specific threat information about a particular 
flight or even a particular airport.”214 The court also noted that the 
visual inspection of bags, though intrusive, is “very similar to the 
intrusions imposed under other, increasingly common, administrative 
security search regimes.”215 
During the same month, approximately 230 miles to the 
northwest, the Lake Champlain Transportation Company (LCT) 
began conducting suspicionless searches of passengers on the ferry 
 
 209. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-
GAO, 2004 WL 1682859 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004). 
 210. Id. at *1. The searches consisted of a “visual search of the hand-carried items of all 
passengers.” Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at *2. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at *4. 
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between Grand Isle, Vermont and Plattsburgh, New York.216 In 
Cassidy v. Chertoff,217 two of the passengers on the ferry claimed the 
searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights.218 Once again, the 
defendants responded by claiming that the searches served a special 
need beyond those of ordinary law enforcement,219 and once again, 
this argument prevailed.220 Even though there was no record of ferries 
being targeted in the United States or anywhere else in the world, the 
Second Circuit held that “the airline cases make it clear that the 
government, in its attempt to counteract the threat of terrorism, need 
not show that every airport or every ferry terminal is threatened by 
terrorism;”221 the search is reasonable as long as the government has 
determined that the ferries “are at a high risk of being involved in a 
transportation security incident.”222 
One year later, the N.Y.P.D. began a program of suspicionless 
searches at various subway stations. Unlike the Boston subway 
searches in American-Arab, which targeted every passenger on a 
certain train or bus line, the New York searches were based on 
seemingly random checkpoints set up at different stations at different 
times,223 and officers at the checkpoints only searched one out of 
every series of passengers.224 The Second Circuit reviewed the 
constitutionality of these searches in MacWade v. Kelly,225 and the 
government again invoked the special needs doctrine, leading the 
court to determine whether the search “serve[d] as [its] immediate 
purpose an objective distinct from the ordinary evidence gathering 
associated with crime investigation.”226 As in the other two public 
 
 216. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 2006). These searches consisted of visual 
inspection of carry-on bags and of the trunks and interior of automobiles on the ferry. Id. at 73. 
 217. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 218. Id. at 73. 
 219. Id. at 74–75. 
 220. Id. at 86–87. 
 221. Id. at 83. 
 222. Id. at 83–84 (quoting Implementation of National Maritime Security Initiatives, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 39,246 (July 1, 2003) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 101)). 
 223. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the times and locations 
of the checkpoints are meant to “appear random, undefined, and unpredictable,” they are 
actually based on a “sophisticated host of criteria, such as fluctuations in passenger volume and 
threat level, overlapping coverage provided by [the N.Y.P.D.’s] other counter-terrorism 
initiatives, and available manpower.” Id. 
 224. Id. at 265. 
 225. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 226. Id. at 268 (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
2010] SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS 883 
transportation cases, the court held that the searches did indeed serve 
a special need, in this case “preventing a terrorist attack on the 
subway.”227 As in all the previous cases, there had been no specific, 
concrete threat to the New York subway system, but the Second 
Circuit still found the threat to be “sufficiently immediate.”228 Unlike 
the Eleventh Circuit in Bourgeois, which refused to allow searches of 
protestors that were merely based on a generalized “threat of 
terrorism,”229 the Second Circuit held that “[a]ll that is required is that 
the ‘risk to public safety [be] substantial and real’ instead of merely 
‘symbolic.’”230 
5. The Current Status of Antiterrorism Searches.  The first wave of 
terrorism left us with routine suspicionless antiterrorism searches at 
all airports and most public buildings. These searches have been 
unanimously upheld by courts under the administrative search 
doctrine, based on the theory that the searches further an 
administrative purpose and were not primarily designed to detect or 
investigate criminal activity. And perhaps just as significantly, these 
searches have now become accepted by nearly every citizen as a 
necessary part of modern life. 
The second wave of terrorism has left behind the possibility of 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches at subways and ferries, though 
such searches are by no means widespread. As of now, these searches 
have generated very little political opposition. Meanwhile, courts 
have rejected suspicionless searches at sporting events, protest rallies, 
and other potential terrorist targets.231 
 
 227. Id. at 263. 
 228. Id. at 272. 
 229. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 230. MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322–23 (1997)). 
 231. Throughout this debate, the Supreme Court has never directly reviewed a single 
antiterrorism suspicionless search case. As noted above, it has implicitly approved of the “first 
wave” of suspicionless searches in dicta—as well as the application of the special needs doctrine 
to those searches—in three separate cases. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–
48 (2000) (“Our holding . . . does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places 
like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public 
safety can be particularly acute.”); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323 (“[W]here the risk to public safety 
is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other 
official buildings.”); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989) 
(“[W]e would not suppose that . . . the government would be precluded from conducting 
[searches at airports] absent a demonstration of danger as to any particular airport or airline.”). 
And although these cases were all decided before September 11, 2001, the broad language used 
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Taking a cue from the earlier airport search cases, courts analyze 
this new wave of cases under the special needs doctrine, but this 
second wave of suspicionless antiterrorism searches—and the judicial 
response to it—both continue to evolve. Law enforcement agencies 
across the country continue to experiment with where to conduct 
these searches and how extensive they should be, and courts still 
struggle to determine the point at which these suspicionless searches 
become unconstitutional—if indeed such a point exists. At one end of 
the spectrum, the Eleventh Circuit held in Bourgeois that 
antiterrorism searches do not serve a special need, whereas the 
Second Circuit in Cassidy and MacWade reached the opposite 
conclusion. And many of the cases that do accept the Cassidy 
rationale—such as Seglen and Johnston—require the threat to reach 
some undefined threshold of specificity before the searches can be 
justified. 
In short, the special needs doctrine does not provide much in the 
way of principled guidance to courts struggling to evaluate 
antiterrorism searches. To make matters worse, outside the 
antiterrorism context, the Supreme Court has been engaged in a 
similar struggle to find a principled distinction between searches for 
special needs and searches for a law enforcement purpose. 
B. Special Needs in Other Contexts 
Two cases in particular show the limits that the Court has tried to 
create for suspicionless searches over the past decade: Indianapolis v. 
Edmond,232 a vehicular checkpoint case, and Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston,233 a suspicionless drug testing case. 
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court considered a 
suspicionless vehicular checkpoint meant to detect cars carrying 
drugs.234 The city of Indianapolis argued that its checkpoint was 
legally identical to the immigration checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte and 
 
points toward an approval of the second wave of antiterrorism searches: for example, the Von 
Raab Court stated that even if there were no demonstration of risk or danger, “[i]t is sufficient 
that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal 
problem from spreading to the particular context.” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3. The Second 
Circuit relied upon this broad language in upholding ferry searches in Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 
F.3d 67, 83 (2d Cir. 2006), and subway searches in MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272. 
 232. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 233. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 234. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34. 
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the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz because those checkpoints “had the 
same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of committing 
crimes.”235 But the Court disagreed, stating that the checkpoint in 
Martinez-Fuente was designed to maintain “the integrity of the 
border”236 and the checkpoint in Sitz was designed to “reduc[e] the 
immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the 
highways.”237 In contrast, the primary purpose of the checkpoint in 
Edmond was “to advance ‘the general interest in crime control.’”238 
The Court noted that it had “never approved a checkpoint program 
whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing.”239 
The Edmond Court realized that the distinction it was making 
was difficult to draw, conceding that “[s]ecuring the border and 
apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities, 
and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal 
prosecutions in pursuit of these goals.”240 The Court, however, argued 
that these valid checkpoints were closely related to the distinct public 
interests of border security and ensuring safe roadways, whereas the 
public interest in preventing illegal drug distribution was nothing 
more than general crime control.241 
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a public hospital in Charleston, 
South Carolina began mandatory drug testing of all pregnant mothers 
who sought treatment.242 The government argued that these 
suspicionless searches served the “special need” of protecting the 
health of the mother and the unborn child,243 citing Skinner, Von 
 
 235. Id. at 42. 
 236. Id. at 38 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)). 
 237. Id. at 39. 
 238. Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). 
 239. Id. at 41. 
 240. Id. at 42. The dissent also pointed out that the distinction made by the majority was 
“not at all obvious.” Id. at 50 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. at 42–44. The definition of “general crime control” was further refined in Illinois v. 
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), in which the Court upheld the use of a suspicionless vehicular 
checkpoint to ask drivers for information about a recent hit and run that had occurred at the 
same location. Id. at 427–28. Although the Court conceded that the Lidster checkpoint, like the 
invalid Edmond checkpoint, was designed to meet the “general interest in crime control,” the 
Court held there was a distinction between determining whether the motorist in the car had 
committed a crime (as in Edmond) and asking the motorist for information about a crime that 
was probably committed by someone else. Id. at 423–24. 
 242. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70–71 (2001). 
 243. Id. at 81. 
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Raab, and Acton.244 But the Court rejected this argument, holding that 
the primary purpose of the searches was crime control rather than 
protecting the fetus’s health.245 The Court distinguished Ferguson 
from the other drug testing cases because the test results in Ferguson 
were turned over to law enforcement and used in criminal 
prosecutions.246 Once again the Court reaffirmed that “[i]n none of 
our previous special needs cases have we upheld the collection of 
evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes.”247 
As in Edmond, the Court worked hard to draw a principled 
distinction between the Ferguson holding and other cases in which the 
Court had upheld suspicionless searches even when the incriminating 
evidence was used in a criminal prosecution. The Court noted that the 
drug tests in Ferguson served the “immediate” purpose of law 
enforcement, whereas the broader social goal of protecting the health 
of the mother and fetus was an “ultimate” goal.248 In the valid special 
needs cases, public safety was the “direct and primary” purpose of the 
search—and using the results in a subsequent prosecution was 
presumably nothing more than a beneficial side effect of the search—
whereas in Ferguson the drug test used law enforcement as a “means 
to an end.”249 “This distinction is critical,” said the Court, “[b]ecause 
law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social 
purpose or objective.”250 Without this distinction, “virtually any 
nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the 
special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its 
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.”251 
 
 244. Id. at 77. 
 245. See id. at 85–86. 
 246. Id. (“The stark and unique fact that characterizes this case is that [this program] was 
designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by the tested patients that would be turned 
over to the police and that could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions.”). 
 247. Id. at 83 n.20. 
 248. Id. at 82–83. 
 249. Id. at 83–84. 
 250. Id. at 84. 
 251. Id. Most recently, the Court’s newfound reluctance to allow suspicionless searches 
could be implied from Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). Although Gant is not a 
suspicionless search case because it covers searches of a suspect’s car after he or she has been 
arrested, it includes language that supports the need for probable cause or a warrant. See, e.g., 
id. at 1721 (“Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would 
serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth 
Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are 
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IV.  CAN SUSPICIONLESS ANTITERRORISM SEARCHES BE JUSTIFIED 
BY THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE? 
Suspicionless searches can be generally grouped into three 
different categories: true administrative searches, which do not 
uncover evidence of criminal activity; searches that uncover evidence 
of criminal activity, but whose fruits cannot be used in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution; and searches whose fruits are in fact used in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution. As this Article demonstrates, the 
special needs doctrine cannot justify this third category of searches, 
and it is in this category that antiterrorism searches belong. 
A. Categorizing Permissible Suspicionless Searches 
The law surrounding permissible suspicionless searches is in a 
state of disarray,252 but it is possible to distill some general principles 
from the various cases. First, there is only one context in which the 
Supreme Court has openly admitted that a suspicionless search is 
permissible for criminal law purposes: searches of probationers and 
parolees.253 In this category of cases, the Court has held that the 
defendant has such a diminished expectation of privacy254 that the 
state has the ability to conduct a suspicionless search and use the 
results to criminally incriminate the defendant.255 
For every other type of suspicionless search, the Court has 
claimed that the search is invalid unless it serves a purpose other than 
traditional law enforcement. The Court uses different language in 
different contexts—the search must not be “aimed at the discovery of 
 
unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully 
further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.”). 
 252. See generally Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The 
Supreme Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 
40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419 (2007) (“[T]he ‘category’ of suspicionless searches [has become] a 
jurisprudential mess, with the only consistent theme being that suspicionless search schemes 
[have been] regularly upheld as lawful.”). 
 253. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 116 (2001). 
 254. The Supreme Court has held that government surveillance does not constitute a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless the surveillance infringes upon 
an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, if an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a certain context—for example, if he is conducting an activity in a public place, or if 
he is in prison—then the government can watch his actions without violating his reasonable 
expectation of privacy and thus not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 255. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. 
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evidence of crime;”256 it must serve “special needs[] beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement;”257 or it must fulfill a purpose other 
than “general crime control”258—but the requirement itself remains 
constant. This requirement—assuming it is actually followed in 
practice—implies that the Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose is to 
prevent the state from invading the rights of citizens during a criminal 
investigation, and so there is no reason why it should limit the 
government’s actions outside the criminal context.259 This is a 
controversial proposition, but it is an inevitable conclusion when 
examining the special needs doctrine. One benefit of this rule—if it 
were actually followed—is that it would result in a bright-line rule 
providing clear guidance to law enforcement and protecting 
individuals from random, suspicionless searches during criminal 
investigations. 
But as this review of the case law has demonstrated, the non–law 
enforcement purpose requirement has not been followed in practice. 
In many of these suspicionless searches, the government conducts 
searches that—if it detects what it is designed to detect—will produce 
evidence of criminal activity: possession of firearms or explosives, 
possession of stolen vehicles, illegal presence in the country, 
possession or use of illegal substances, or driving while intoxicated. 
And to state that the purpose of the search is distinct from the 
“normal need for law enforcement” is merely a semantic game 
because the special need that justifies the weaker search standard is 
usually nothing more than the policy justification for the original 
criminalization of the conduct. Hijacking is illegal because of the 
dangers it poses to airline passengers; immigration laws exist to 
secure the country’s borders; drugs are illegal because those who use 
them suffer health effects and an impairment of their abilities; drunk 
driving is prohibited because those who drink and drive create a 
danger on the public roadways. 
In this sense, the suspicionless search jurisprudence is little more 
than an exercise in redefining the nature of criminal activity and 
 
 256. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
 257. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 258. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000). 
 259. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 563 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“[The Fourth Amendment safeguards] should govern border searches when 
carried out for purposes of criminal investigation.”). 
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thereby redefining the permissible methods of detecting that activity. 
A police officer could enforce the law against drunk driving, a law 
that exists to keep the highways safe, or she could set up a checkpoint 
to detect drunk drivers to keep the highways safe, and in so doing 
detect individuals who are breaking the law. In the former case, she 
would need to have probable cause before pulling over a car, whereas 
in the latter case, she would not need any level of individualized 
suspicion because keeping highways safe is a special need. 
To be fair, this objection does not fit all of the permissible 
suspicionless search cases equally. For some of them, the lack of a law 
enforcement purpose is more than a semantic difference; it is an 
important distinction that alters the nature and extent of the search in 
significant ways. To understand this point, it is helpful to divide the 
special needs cases into three different categories. 
The first category consists of the original administrative searches, 
in which non–law enforcement officials conduct searches to enforce 
health and safety violations. These include building code inspections, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration workplace 
inspections, mine safety inspections, and the like. Such searches do 
not seek to enforce criminal laws, and so the searches represent a 
“less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the 
fruits and instrumentalities of crime.”260 This category does not 
include all administrative search cases because courts have applied 
the “administrative search” term to a number of cases in which the 
search has a clear crime-control purpose. For example, the search in 
New York v. Burger—in which the police searched a junkyard for 
evidence of stolen auto parts and ultimately arrested the junkyard 
owner on criminal charges—was termed an administrative search 
even though it was designed to uncover evidence of criminal 
activity.261 
The second category is comprised of searches that are designed 
to uncover evidence of unambiguously criminal activity, but that can 
legitimately be classified as special needs searches because the results 
are not used for a law enforcement purpose. In these cases, the search 
serves a purpose “other than that of traditional law enforcement,” not 
because of the type of information being sought, but rather because 
 
 260. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. 
 261. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708–10 (1987). Burger belongs in the third 
category of suspicionless search cases because the search was upheld based on the defendant’s 
reduced expectation of privacy. Id. at 703–07. 
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of what is done with the information after it is obtained. This category 
includes the drug tests of school children and public employees, which 
are designed to find evidence of criminal activity, but whose results 
are not used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
The third category involves searches that have a clear law 
enforcement purpose, and whose results are used by law enforcement 
in criminal prosecutions. This category includes antiterrorism 
searches, vehicular checkpoints, and some of the later administrative 
searches in cases such as Burger. For some of these searches, the 
Supreme Court has stressed that the nature of the intrusion is very 
slight and that the subject has a reduced expectation of privacy—
briefly stopping a vehicle or checking records and inventory for a 
highly regulated business—though these factors are not present for 
antiterrorism searches. But assuming individuals in these situations 
have some expectation of privacy (unlike probationers and parolees), 
courts must still engage in the semantic game of redefining a crime-
control search as a special needs search. 
B. Placing Antiterrorism Searches into the Proper Category 
Once permissible suspicionless search cases are organized in this 
manner, it becomes easy to see that suspicionless antiterrorism cases 
fall into the third category of special needs cases. These searches are 
conducted by law enforcement personnel—police, TSA officers, court 
officers—and any incriminating search results may be used against 
the suspect in a criminal trial. And what is more, these searches are 
even less defensible than the other special needs cases in that 
category because the other cases involve situations in which the 
suspect has a reduced expectation of privacy. In contrast, courts have 
held that subjects of antiterrorism searches—unlike parolees or 
occupants of cars—“possess[] an undiminished expectation of 
privacy” for items carried on their bodies or in their bags.262 
Furthermore, the ultrafine distinction that courts make between 
special needs and law enforcement needs is especially strained in the 
antiterrorism context. As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in 
Bourgeois, the alleged special need of “public safety” is “inextricably 
intertwined” with the goal of crime control in the antiterrorism 
 
 262. See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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context.263 Antiterrorism searches are designed to prevent individuals 
from intentionally committing acts of violence, and to apprehend 
those who attempt to commit these acts; to claim that this is a public 
safety purpose rather than a law-enforcement or crime-control 
purpose is simply disingenuous.264 
As noted above,265 the early cases that justified antiterrorism 
searches as administrative searches were reacting to an extraordinary 
situation in which there appeared to be no other way to prevent an 
epidemic of hijackings and bombings of public buildings. The only 
doctrine available at the time to justify suspicionless searches was the 
administrative search rationale from Camara. These early courts 
therefore borrowed the terms “administrative” and “regulatory” from 
Camara and used them in a way that had nothing to do with the 
terms’ actual meaning. The Ninth Circuit, for example, noted that 
searches at airports were “conducted as part of a general regulatory 
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to 
prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and 
thereby to prevent hijackings.”266 To say that blanket, suspicionless 
searches of everyone who boards a plane is a “regulatory scheme” is 
simply an exercise in making a term mean whatever one wants it to 
mean; likewise, the prevention of violent crimes is an “administrative 
 
 263. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 180–
85 and accompanying text. 
 264. There is, perhaps, a distinction between trying to prevent crime and trying to detect 
crime. If a government activity is only meant to prevent crime, the individualized suspicion 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment should not apply. For example, installing a window 
made of bulletproof glass at all post office counters is a method of preventing crimes—there is 
surely no need to demonstrate individualized suspicion for every customer who approaches the 
window. It could be argued that suspicionless antiterrorism searches should be analogized to 
these bulletproof glass windows—if a government agent searched everyone who entered the 
post office, for example, the search would only be intended to prevent crimes, and so there 
would be no need to demonstrate any individualized suspicion. The problem with making this 
distinction is that in practice the suspicionless antiterrorist searches are used both to prevent 
and detect crime—and ultimately to punish the criminal as well. If the search recovers a 
weapon, the subject of the search is arrested and the weapon is used as evidence in a subsequent 
prosecution. The only way to ensure that the suspicionless searches are truly only being used to 
prevent a crime would be to preclude the government from using any fruits of the search in a 
subsequent prosecution. See infra Part VI.B. 
 265. See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text. 
 266. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States v. 
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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purpose” only if one invents a completely new definition for the term 
“administrative.”267 
This contrivance has been encouraged by the confused way in 
which the special needs doctrine has evolved over the past few 
decades, with different justifications becoming significant in different 
contexts. If the same doctrine is applied to widely different factual 
situations (from conducting building code inspections to drug testing 
schoolchildren to detecting terrorists on the subway), it creates 
confusion when one court interprets the language of another court’s 
precedent. Consider Von Raab, the case in which the Supreme Court 
upheld suspicionless drug testing of United States customs 
employees. The search in this case falls into the second category of 
permissible suspicionless searches—because the results of the test are 
not used for criminal prosecution, the Court can legitimately claim 
that the search serves a special need unrelated to law enforcement.268 
But the court also attempts to place this search into the first 
category—claiming that it serves a purely “administrative” or 
“regulatory” purpose by analogizing the use of cocaine by customs 
employees to the inventory searches: “[T]he traditional probable-
cause standard may be unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of 
routine administrative functions, especially when the Government 
seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to 
detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for 
searching any particular place or person.”269 In making this argument, 
the Court cites a number of legitimate administrative search cases, 
including an inventory search case,270 a border search case,271 and a 
building code inspection case.272 
It is already a bit of a stretch to say that cocaine use by customs 
officials is a “hazardous condition” equivalent to building code 
 
 267. Once this terminology had become enshrined in precedent, it was perpetuated by later 
generations of cases. The Ninth Circuit recently upheld an airport search as an administrative 
search, quoting this same language from the Davis case. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 
960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 268. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). The Court 
also notes that customs employees have a diminished expectation of privacy, id. at 672, but this 
was not the primary reason that the searches were found constitutional. 
 269. Id. at 668 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 270. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369–71 (1987). 
 271. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556–57 (1976). 
 272. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–36 (1967). 
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violations, and it is difficult to equate suspicionless drug testing with 
the “routine administrative function” of searching an automobile 
before it is impounded. But the Court persisted in its analogy, stating 
that drug use by customs agents was a “latent or hidden condition[],” 
and “discover[ing] . . . or . . . prevent[ing] the[] development” of such 
conditions justified a suspicionless search.273 
The lower courts that applied the special needs doctrine to 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches merely carried this analogy one 
step further. For example, this is how the Second Circuit in MacWade 
upheld suspicionless searches on the subway: 
  As a legal matter, courts traditionally have considered special the 
government’s need to “prevent” and “discover . . . latent or hidden” 
hazards, Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, in order to ensure the safety of 
mass transportation mediums, such as trains, airplanes, and 
highways. We have no doubt that concealed explosives are a hidden 
hazard . . . . Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from bombing the 
subways constitutes a special need that is distinct from ordinary post 
hoc criminal investigation. Further, the fact that an officer 
incidentally may discover a different kind of contraband and arrest 
its possessor does not alter the [p]rogram’s intended purpose.274 
A terrorist attempting to carry a bomb onto a subway (or an 
airplane) is not a “latent or hidden hazard.” He is an individual 
attempting to commit an extremely serious crime. Any attempt to 
deter or detect his actions is purely a law enforcement function, and 
should be treated as such. And any attempt by courts to claim that a 
search designed to detect and prevent this crime is an administrative 
or regulatory search cannot ultimately be sustained. 
Thus, even the contorted jurisprudence of the special needs 
doctrine cannot justify these searches. But this conclusion leads to 
another question: if suspicionless antiterrorist searches cannot be 
justified by the special needs doctrine, is there any other way to 
justify them? We will address this question in Part V. 
 
 273. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668. 
 274. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 270–71 (2d Cir. 2006) (first alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
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V.  OTHER POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUSPICIONLESS 
ANTITERRORIST SEARCHES 
At first, the search for a legitimate justification for suspicionless 
antiterrorist searches may appear to be a waste of time, or at best a 
purely academic pursuit. In reality, antiterrorism searches in airports 
and courthouses are ubiquitous, widely accepted, and seemingly 
indispensable. But it is important to find a legitimate doctrinal 
underpinning for these searches for two reasons. First, courts’ 
responses to the second phase of antiterrorism searches have been 
wildly inconsistent, both in terms of reasoning and results. And 
second, continued application of the special needs doctrine to these 
searches will create confusing precedent that could be applied to 
other areas of the law, leading to even greater damage to the 
individualized suspicion requirement. Thus, it is worth seeking 
another justification for suspicionless antiterrorism searches—or, if 
one cannot be found, to find another way to reconcile these searches 
with the Fourth Amendment.275 Other commentators have suggested 
numerous justifications for suspicionless antiterrorism searches—
using a generalized “reasonableness” test, deferring to the legislature, 
applying the doctrine of implied consent, and creating an entirely new 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. But as this Article 
demonstrates, none of these proposals can serve to justify these 
searches. 
A. Evaluation Under a Generalized Reasonableness Test 
Even if antiterrorism searches cannot be justified as a special 
need, most courts and commentators (and indeed lay people) would 
still find them constitutional under the general test of reasonableness. 
As the Supreme Court has repeated dozens of times, reasonableness 
is the “touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental 
search,”276 and whether or not a search is reasonable “depends on all 
of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure.”277 When the 
circuit courts first began approving the suspicionless antiterrorist 
searches in the early 1970s, many of them relied on a generalized 
 
 275. For a discussion of how to reconcile these searches with the Fourth Amendment, see 
infra Part VI. 
 276. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002). 
 277. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)). 
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reasonableness standard, “balancing the need for a search against the 
offensiveness of the intrusion.”278 Indeed, all of the current 
suspicionless antiterrorism cases—after applying the special needs 
test to bypass the general requirement of a warrant and probable 
cause—essentially apply a reasonableness analysis. The Second 
Circuit defines the suspicionless antiterrorism test as follows: 
First, as a threshold matter, the search must “serve as [its] 
immediate purpose an objective distinct from the ordinary evidence 
gathering associated with crime investigation.” Second, once the 
government satisfies that threshold requirement, the court 
determines whether the search is reasonable by balancing several 
competing considerations. These balancing factors include (1) the 
weight and immediacy of the government interest; (2) “the nature of 
the privacy interest allegedly compromised by” the search; (3) “the 
character of the intrusion imposed by” the search; and (4) the 
efficacy of the search in advancing the government interest.279 
So why not abolish the somewhat artificial threshold test of 
special needs and simply skip to the second step and conduct a 
reasonableness analysis? The extremely violent and destructive 
nature of terrorist acts surely affects the appropriateness of a search 
meant to detect or deter such acts, and this factor would be reflected 
in a general reasonableness test. For example, if police have twenty-
four hours to find an atomic bomb that they know is hidden in one of 
a hundred houses, it would be reasonable for them to conduct 
suspicionless searches of each of those houses.280 If police pull over 
every car that drives by a reservoir because the dam is a “potential 
terrorist target,” the search would likely be unreasonable. 
But these are the extreme cases—and therefore the easy cases. 
As our review of the second wave of antiterrorism case law shows, it 
is indeed the hard cases that make bad, confusing, and inconsistent 
law. Thus, finding a reasonable, principled justification for these 
searches is critical—and it is more important now than ever. If there 
is no principled way to evaluate antiterrorism searches, then there is 
no way of knowing the limits of these searches—if they have limits at 
all.281 Under the current law, the only thing resembling a principled 
limitation to the searches is the factor explicitly stated in Johnston 
 
 278. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 279. MacWade, 460 F.3d at 268–69 (citations omitted). 
 280. For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Gould & Stern, supra note 3, at 779–80. 
 281. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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and Stauber (and hinted at in Seglen and Bourgeois): that 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches are unconstitutional unless there 
is a “concrete danger” that is “substantial and real.”282 In rejecting the 
suspicionless searches of individuals at sporting arenas, Johnston and 
Seglen noted that there had been no history of terrorist attacks or 
threats against sporting arenas283—in contrast, Johnston argues that 
searches of public buildings were allowed after “an outburst of acts of 
violence, bombings of federal buildings and hundreds of bomb 
threats, resulting in massive evacuations of federal property and 
direct financial loss to the Government,”284 and searches in the New 
York City subway were allowed because “NYC’s mass transit system, 
including the subway system, had been targeted by terrorists in the 
past, and within the last year terrorists had bombed commuter trains 
in Madrid, the subway system in Moscow and had attempted to bomb 
the London subway system.”285 
Thus, under the current reasonableness analysis, the only 
limiting factor for suspicionless antiterrorist searches is whether a 
threat is “substantial and real” or merely the background threat of 
terrorism that presumably has become part of everyday existence.286 
But this is rather thin protection; there is little doubt that if a terrorist 
attack occurred at a sporting arena or a political protest, the holdings 
in Johnston and Seglen or Stauber and Bourgeois would be overruled 
by the next court to consider searches in these contexts. In this sense, 
it is the terrorists who control the extent of our Fourth Amendment 
rights: by hijacking planes and blowing up buildings, they persuade 
courts to allow suspicionless searches at airports and public buildings; 
 
 282. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d per 
curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam); Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *93 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004); see also Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 
1311; State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 707–08 (N.D. 2005). 
 283. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–69; Seglen, 700 N.W.2d at 708. 
 284. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (quoting Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1231–32 
(6th Cir. 1972)). 
 285. Id. (citing MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 286. This rule means that a judge must somehow determine at what point the ever-present 
“background threat” of terrorism becomes a “substantial and real” threat. If a terrorist group 
issues a statement that it will attack a sports arena sometime in the next year, does that make 
the threat to all sports arenas substantial and real? What if it named a city but no date? Would it 
matter if the terrorist group had been known to have successfully committed terrorist acts in the 
past? In short, how could a judge intelligently determine the probability of such a threat, and 
what is the probability threshold for “substantial and real”? 
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by bombing mass transit in London, Madrid, and Moscow, they 
convince courts to allow suspicionless searches on ferries and 
subways; if they successfully target a sports arena or a political protest 
rally, courts will (under current doctrine) begin to allow suspicionless 
searches in those contexts as well. And as this Article’s discussion of 
the first wave of suspicionless antiterrorist searches demonstrates, the 
search procedures (and their acceptance by the courts and by the 
general population) does not end when the threat subsides. 
Throughout the 1990s there was not a single domestic passenger 
airplane hijacking, and the epidemic of shootings and bombings of 
courthouses disappeared—yet the suspicionless searches continued, 
and probably will continue forever. As noted above, the Supreme 
Court cited the infinitesimally low number of airplane hijackers 
caught through the suspicionless search program as evidence that the 
programs were “successful.”287 Yet when this “successful” 
suspicionless search program failed spectacularly—resulting in the 
death of 3,000 Americans on a single day—the government reaction 
was to make the suspicionless searches even more rigorous and 
intrusive, and the reaction of the courts was to reaffirm (in even 
stronger language) the necessity and constitutionality of those 
searches.288 
More generally, antiterrorist searches are particularly ill suited to 
a generalized balancing test or a reasonableness analysis, for the 
simple reason that the gravity of the potential harm is so great that it 
overpowers any other variable that could be placed into the balancing 
equation. Every first-year criminal law student is presented with some 
variant of this classic hypothetical, intended to highlight the 
difference between utilitarianism and retributivism: would the police 
be justified in torturing an innocent person if it could provide 
information that would prevent a nuclear bomb from detonating and 
destroying a city? The threat of terrorism turns the second half of this 
hypothetical into grim reality: wouldn’t it be reasonable to allow 
nearly any type of surveillance or search program if it could prevent 
 
 287. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. In Von Raab, the Court noted that in fifteen 
years, 9.5 billion people and ten billion pieces of luggage had undergone a suspicionless search, 
and only forty-two thousand firearms had been detected. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989). Thus, every suspicionless search that occurred had a 
.00042 percent chance of detecting a firearm. 
 288. See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he events of 
September 11, 2001, only emphasize the heightened need to conduct searches at this nation’s 
international airports.”). 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
898 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:843 
 
catastrophic harm?289 Should a court somehow give less weight to the 
government interest in a search seeking to prevent a terrorist attack 
that may only kill a few hundred people as opposed to many 
thousands of people? Can a court really evaluate the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack in any given context, other than by simply accepting 
the risk assessment the government provides for them? 
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Bourgeois, “reasonableness” is 
a term of art in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence;290 courts must 
interpret the term “in the light of established Fourth Amendment 
principles,”291 including the warrant requirement, prior judicial 
scrutiny, probable cause, and individualized suspicion.292 It is very rare 
for a search that lacks any of these requirements to be deemed 
“reasonable.” If the term were given its ordinary meaning, the 
constitutionality of a search would be determined by “the judge’s 
personal opinions about the governmental and privacy interests at 
stake.”293 
 
 289. In a recent article, Anthony Coveny described the current balancing test for 
suspicionless searches as a mathematical formula, in which PC stands for public concern, E is a 
percentage that represents the efficacy of the searches, and LI stands for the level of intrusion of 
the search. If PC x E > LI, the search should be allowed, but if PC x E < LI, then the search is 
unreasonable and hence unconstitutional. Coveny, supra note 2, at 379–80. When public 
concern is preventing terrorism, PC is essentially infinite. Coveny quotes the Second Circuit 
statement that “the government interest in preventing a terrorist attack on the subway was ‘of 
the very highest order.’” Id. at 379 (quoting MacWade, 460 F.3d at 267). Other courts use similar 
language when applying the balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]here can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of 
paramount importance.”); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It is 
hard to overestimate the need to search air travelers for weapons and explosives . . . .”). 
Therefore, “as long as the effectiveness measure is anything but zero, the level of intrusiveness 
is near immaterial.” Coveny, supra note 2, at 379. And if PC is not set to infinity, how should it 
be calculated in evaluating the reasonableness of most antiterrorist searches? 
 290. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 503 (2007) (discussing why courts have not adopted a test for reasonableness). 
 291. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969)). 
 292. Id. at 1313–16. 
 293. See id. at 1314. A number of commentators have also recognized this problem. 
Professor Ricardo Bascuas notes that using a balancing test to determine what is “reasonable” is 
not even “a legal inquiry or test” because 
it is not a process of discerning general rules or principles and applying them 
evenhandedly to specific disputes as they arise. Rather, balancing is for judges, as 
Justice Scalia put it, “a regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that 
we have passed the point where ‘law,’ properly speaking, has any further 
application.” The vagueness of the term “reasonable” makes not only the outcome 
but the very criteria of the “test” unpredictable. 
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Therefore, reasonableness alone provides neither a principled 
reason for allowing suspicionless antiterrorist searches, nor a sensible, 
robust limitation on their use. A search for a more principled basis to 
justify these searches will not only help to legitimate them, but will 
also contain them so that they do not swallow up the entire Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. Legislatures Should Decide What Is Reasonable 
Political process theory offers a more sophisticated defense of 
the reasonableness analysis by arguing that the democratic process 
will provide necessary limits on the government’s behavior. The 
argument runs like this: because the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches is indeterminate, the task falls 
to either courts or legislatures to interpret the meaning and scope of 
the term.294 According to political process theory, the legislature 
should conduct this task because the interpretation of democratically 
elected legislators is more legitimate than the opinions of unelected 
judges.295 The courts should thus defer to the legislatures in these 
situations, and only conduct a rational basis review of any legislative 
interpretations of ambiguous constitutional terms. 
 
Bascuas, supra note 2, at 748 (footnote omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (1989)). Professor Thomas Clancy, writing in 
1995—well before the second wave of antiterrorism searches began—warned against 
suspicionless “checkpoints and detectors . . . at stadiums, in schools, and at other public 
gatherings,” all justified by a “totally subjective reasonableness analysis.” Thomas K. Clancy, 
The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 
25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 624–25, 627 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Clancy argues that there must 
be a “return to the central importance given to individualized suspicion by the framers,” though 
he does not explain how this will apply to airport searches. Id. at 634. Bascuas proposes his own 
test for antiterrorism searches, which this Article discusses infra at notes 335–38 and 
accompanying text. 
  Indeed, the vague nature of the term “reasonableness” was evident in the Supreme 
Court’s most recent school search case, in which a schoolgirl was strip-searched on suspicion 
that she was carrying illegal prescription drugs. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 
S. Ct. 2633, 2641–43 (2009). Whether it was reasonable for school officials to conduct such an 
intrusive search to combat the possession and distribution of drugs in school comes down to 
little more than the personal opinion of the judge or judges hearing the case. In Safford United 
School District No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009), the trial judge found the search to be 
reasonable, a three-judge appellate panel agreed, an en banc panel split sharply on the question, 
and the Supreme Court finally ruled that the search was unreasonable. Id. at 2637–39. 
 294. Political process theory focuses on ambiguous terms in the Constitution, such as due 
process, equal protection, or unreasonable searches and seizures. See Richard C. Worf, supra 
note 2, at 100–01. 
 295. Id at 101. 
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Aside from the increased legitimacy from the democratic 
process, legislative interpretations of reasonableness are superior to 
judicial determinations for two reasons. First, the legislature is in a far 
better position than the courts to determine what is reasonable—it 
can run a cost-benefit analysis and has better access to the necessary 
facts in making such a determination.296 Second, the legislature is 
more flexible. It can vary from state to state or even city to city, 
depending on the preferences of the community, and if circumstances 
change—if terrorists begin a successful campaign of violence, for 
example—it can adapt much more quickly than the precedent-bound 
judicial system.297 
Political process theory recognizes that the democratic process 
sometimes breaks down, at which point courts must be more 
aggressive in reviewing a given search. For example, if a search 
procedure had been instituted by the executive branch, either without 
legislative approval or pursuant to an overly broad grant of discretion 
on the part of the legislature, courts would need to conduct a strict 
scrutiny analysis.298 Similarly, courts should intervene when searches 
disadvantage a discrete and insular minority, who may not have 
adequate representation in the legislature.299 In other words, the 
Fourth Amendment is only meant to be a check on majoritarian rule 
when the political process cannot work effectively.300 
Permissible suspicionless searches are particularly easy to justify 
under political process theory—provided they are properly 
authorized by the legislature—because they are nondiscriminatory by 
their very nature. They are not directed at a specific class of 
underprivileged or disenfranchised individuals; they affect everyone 
more or less equally. Thus, assuming the benefits and costs of the 
search are spread equally throughout the voting community, the 
search program cannot be seen as the result of a failure of the 
democratic process. 
Furthermore, deference to legislators seems even more sensible 
in the context of antiterrorism searches. It is hard enough for judges 
 
 296. Id. at 120–26. 
 297. Id. at 129–30 (“If mass terror strikes, it might be disastrous to apply old precedents to 
determine what constitutes a reasonable general search or seizure.”). 
 298. Id. at 138–52. 
 299. Id. at 152–58. 
 300. Id. at 189–90. 
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to make reasoned, informed judgments about the necessity and 
efficacy of other types of searches, such as roadblocks to prevent 
drunk driving, or frisks to determine if suspects carry a weapon. But 
this task becomes even more daunting for antiterrorism searches. The 
Second Circuit in MacWade explained why it deferred to the 
government’s experts who testified that the suspicionless subway 
searches were an effective method of deterring a terrorist attack: 
We will not peruse, parse, or extrapolate four months’ worth of 
data . . . . Counter-terrorism experts and politically accountable 
officials have undertaken the delicate and esoteric task of deciding 
how best to marshal their available resources in light of the 
conditions prevailing on any given day. We will not—and may not—
second-guess the minutiae of their considered decisions.301 
But MacWade is an outlier in this instance. For the most part, 
courts have rejected applying political process theory to the Fourth 
Amendment,302 and with good reason. Given the central role of the 
Fourth Amendment in criminal procedure jurisprudence, deferring to 
the democratically elected legislature to determine what is reasonable 
is deeply troubling. Some commentators, such as Professor Akhil 
Amar, have argued persuasively that the Fourth Amendment should 
not be thought of primarily as a rule of criminal procedure303—but 
there is no denying that, rightly or wrongly, this is what the Fourth 
Amendment has become. And as a rule of criminal procedure—
whose primary purpose is to protect the individual citizen from 
overreaching by the government during criminal prosecutions—the 
Fourth Amendment is dangerously unsuitable for political process 
analysis. 
It is no accident that political process analysis has not been 
applied to the rest of the criminal procedure rules in the Bill of 
Rights—there is no deference to the legislature to determine when 
Miranda rights apply, for example, or when the right to counsel 
attaches. Granted, the term “unreasonable” is ambiguous enough to 
require interpretation, but giving a majority of voters the right to 
 
 301. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 274 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 302. Even the strongest proponents of political process theory concede that the Fourth 
Amendment has “remained largely invulnerable to political process theory.” Worf, supra note 
2, at 103–04 (noting Akhil Amar’s acknowledgment that political process theory has had little 
influence on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 303. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758–59 
(1994). 
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interpret it—and thereby set the parameters for how police interact 
with ordinary citizens—could lead to extreme results, for two reasons. 
First, a majority of voters (or their representatives who make the 
laws) will frequently overreact in times of crisis, trading freedoms in 
exchange for short-term security. The government responses to this 
decade’s second wave of terrorism are a case in point: in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks, the federal government took a number of 
steps to curtail civil liberties to detect and prevent other terrorist 
activities, including detaining citizens indefinitely without charge and 
without providing counsel, eavesdropping on conversations between 
attorneys and clients, and broadening the scope of wiretapping 
programs.304 The courts have been very active in reviewing and in 
some cases rejecting these reactions.305 
Political process theory would approve of judicial review of some 
of these rules—for example, rules allowing the government to listen 
in on conversations between criminal law attorneys and clients only 
burden accused criminals, who hardly have a proportionate say in the 
legislature. Others—those that apply broadly to all citizens—would 
be left untouched by courts if judges agreed to defer to the legislative 
enactments. But these rules are not the result of a reflective 
legislative body calmly weighing the costs and benefits—indeed, they 
are little better than pandering to the political moment. 
This short-term pandering might not be so dangerous were it not 
for the second problem: once civil liberties are restricted, the 
restrictions are essentially permanent. What the majority of voters 
think is reasonable will inevitably reflect the rules that they have 
grown accustomed to in their everyday lives. The reason that searches 
at airports and public courthouses are now thought to be reasonable 
by the vast majority of citizens has nothing to do with whether they 
are in fact a sensible, least intrusive solution to a severe and ongoing 
problem—though they may in fact be. Rather, they are thought to be 
reasonable because they have been around for so long that we no 
longer even notice them or perceive them to be intrusive. And regular 
searches in some contexts also tend to desensitize individuals to 
identical searches in other contexts—that is, now that suspicionless 
 
 304. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
2010] SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS 903 
searches are ubiquitous at airports, people are less likely to find them 
unreasonable at schools, rock concerts, sporting events, and so on.306 
Courts, on the other hand, are far more insulated from the 
politics of the moment, and far more likely to uphold the principles of 
the Fourth Amendment—even in times of crisis, which is when such a 
defense is needed the most. This is not to say that the courts’ analyses 
and holdings are immune to changes in the world, merely that they 
are more likely to apply constant principles of law to the evolving 
threats and dangers that arise.307 
Simply put, it is not very comforting to conclude that the Fourth 
Amendment—a fundamental protection against government 
overreaching—says whatever the government wants it to say. If the 
Fourth Amendment is to have any meaning at all, courts must have 
the power to review the constitutionality of searches against some 
principled standard. 
C. Consent 
Even if there is no principled reason to allow suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches, law enforcement could conceivably rely on the 
implied or express consent given by the individual being searched. In 
other words, if the individual does not wish to be searched, he or she 
can simply choose not to board an airplane, ride the subway, or 
attend the political protest. Conversely, if the individual does choose 
to engage in the activity, he or she is consenting—at least implicitly—
to the search that goes along with the activity. 
 
 306. See, e.g., Sara Kornblatt, Note, Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger 
Screening Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 385, 404–05 (2007) 
(“There are metal detectors at courthouses, schools, and stadiums. While some may find 
magnetometers at these types of locations annoying, society in general has allowed their use 
without an uproar that Fourth Amendment rights are being violated.” (footnote omitted)). 
 307. There is even an argument that once a threat has receded, courts are more likely than 
voters to revisit the restrictions on liberty that they put into place. Professor William Stuntz has 
noted that the twentieth century saw a pattern in the way the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment: “Crime fell in the 1940s and 1950s; Fourth Amendment rights expanded in 
the 1960s. Crime rose sharply in the 1960s; Fourth Amendment protection receded in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Crime fell again in the 1990s, and by the end of that decade Fourth Amendment 
rights were once again expanding.” William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE 
L.J. 2137, 2155 (2002). Thus, it is not that courts are unresponsive to the changing world, but 
that they are merely slower to respond—both for institutional reasons, and because they are 
applying fixed principles of law, which legislatures do not do. This deliberateness is probably a 
virtue when courts are considering alterations to the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. 
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 Consent is a well-established exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement of individualized suspicion.308 Law 
enforcement officers are permitted to search anyone, for any reason, 
as long as the individual agrees to the search. In the early years, some 
courts relied—at least in part—on an implied-consent argument to 
justify suspicionless antiterrorism searches. In United States v. 
Davis,309 for example, the Ninth Circuit argued that airport screenings 
are constitutional “only if they recognize the right of a person to 
avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft.”310 This was in part 
because a consensual search was thought to be less intrusive than a 
compulsory search, but also because this helped to ensure that the 
purpose of the search was the special need of preventing hijackings 
rather than the law enforcement need of general crime control: 
[A] compelled search . . . would not contribute to barring weapons 
and explosives from the plane, [and therefore] it could serve only 
the purpose of apprehending violators of either the criminal 
prohibition against attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a 
concealed weapon . . . or some other criminal statute. Such searches 
would be criminal investigations subject to the warrant and probable 
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.311 
Even today, implied consent is frequently cited as one of the 
factors that courts consider in their balancing test, though not a 
dispositive one. The Third Circuit has argued that searches of airline 
passengers are “less offensive” because “[a]ir passengers choose to 
fly,” and they are on notice that they will be searched at the airport.312 
Other courts have rejected suspicionless antiterrorism searches in 
part because of a lack of implied consent. For example, the district 
court that struck down the searches in the Boston subway noted that 
proper notice would have “provide[d] an opportunity for persons who 
do not want to permit inspection to avoid traveling on the MBTA,”313 
 
 308. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 20 F.3d 926, 930 (1994) (“[W]e note that police officers 
may search an area, even without probable cause or a warrant, if someone with adequate 
authority has consented to the search . . . .”). 
 309. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States v. 
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 310. Id. at 910–11. 
 311. Id. at 911–12 (citation omitted). 
 312. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 313. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-
GAO, 2004 WL 1682859, at *3 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004). 
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whereas the court that struck down the searches at Tampa’s stadium 
noted that the plaintiff was never informed of the search policy 
before purchasing his tickets and therefore could not have consented 
to the search at the time of purchase.314 Conversely, the Second 
Circuit upheld suspicionless searches in the New York subway in part 
because the individuals being searched have a choice to either submit 
to the search or turn away and not ride the subway.315 
But there is a significant problem associated with relying on 
implied consent to justify suspicionless antiterrorism searches: the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine holds that it 
could be unconstitutional if the government conditions participation 
in a certain activity on the waiver of a constitutional right.316 The 
 
 314. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1271–72 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d 
per curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 315. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit never 
used implied consent as a legal justification for the search; instead it applied the fact that 
individuals could choose to walk away as evidence that the search was “minimally intrusive,” id. 
at 273, which is one of the three factors of the reasonableness balancing test for the special 
needs doctrine, id. at 269. 
  There is a recent Ninth Circuit case that appears to hold that the constitutionality of 
these searches does not depend on consent, but in reality it only specifies the type of consent 
that is required. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In 
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), the defendant voluntarily 
subjected himself to a metal detector and a secondary screening at the airport, but when he was 
directed to empty his pockets, he refused, telling the TSA officials that he no longer wished to 
board the plane and asking to leave the airport. Id. at 957–58. This request was refused, and a 
subsequent search of the defendant revealed several baggies of methamphetamine and a glass 
pipe. Id. at 958. 
  The Ninth Circuit relied on the administrative search doctrine to uphold the search, 
and went out of its way to note that the constitutionality of the search did not depend on the 
defendant’s consent; thus, the defendant could not revoke his consent and tell the officers that 
he no longer wished to fly. Id. at 960–61. But a few sentences later it noted that “all that is 
required [for the search to be constitutional] is the passenger’s election to attempt entry into the 
secured area of an airport.” Id. at 961 (footnote omitted). Thus, for all its strong language about 
consent not being a necessary element, it appears that the Aukai case simply specifies what kind 
of consent is required, without abolishing a consent requirement altogether. Once individuals 
choose to undertake an activity (and thus implicitly agree to a search), there comes a point at 
which they cannot back out of the activity and withdraw their consent. In other words, this 
holding is not inconsistent with a theory that would justify all suspicionless antiterrorism 
searches using implied consent. For a recent discussion of these issues, see generally Bethany A. 
Gulley, Case Note, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007), 31 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 515 (2009). 
 316. See, e.g., Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions prohibits terminating [prisoner] benefits, though not classified as 
entitlements, if the termination is based on motivations that other constitutional provisions 
proscribe.”); Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (ordering 
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Bourgeois and Johnston courts rejected an implied-consent 
justification on these grounds, noting that an individual’s right to 
attend a protest or even a “property interest in his season tickets and 
his right to attend [football] games and assemble with other 
Buccaneers fans” could not be conditioned on a surrender of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.317 
The reason the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions presents a 
problem is that—like a generalized definition of reasonableness—this 
doctrine also fails to provide a principled, bright-line test. The 
Seventh Circuit notes that “conditions can lawfully be imposed on the 
receipt of a benefit—conditions that may include the surrender of a 
constitutional right, such as the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures—provided the conditions are reasonable.”318 
Thus, attempting to use implied consent as a justification for 
suspicionless searches leads to the same conclusion, and creates the 
same problem—in the end it is up to the judge to decide, after 
balancing all the factors, whether it is reasonable to condition the 
right to travel by air (or enter a public courthouse or attend a football 
game) on the individual’s waiver of their Fourth Amendment right. 
And once again, the case law shows the inconsistency that inevitably 
results from such a broad, discretionary test: courts have said that it is 
unreasonable to condition entry to a football game or a rock concert 
on a Fourth Amendment waiver;319 yet it is not unreasonable to 
require consent before entering a courthouse or boarding a plane.320 
 
resentencing because “[t]he effect of the trial judge’s questioning [of the defendant] was to 
impose an unconstitutional condition on the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights: he could go 
into the details of the other offense . . . that might constitute a confession or he could exercise 
his right to be silent and receive a long sentence”); Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 399 F.2d 
11, 13 (5th Cir. 1968) (“The plaintiffs [were] admitted to the school system, but had been denied 
the opportunity to transfer from a Negro to a white school. Once the plaintiffs had been 
admitted to the school system, they had a constitutional right to a desegregated education, and 
have standing to enforce that right—free of any unconstitutional condition precedent.” (quoting 
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1967))). 
 317. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; accord Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324–25 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 318. Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 319. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; Nakamoto v. Fasi, 64 Haw. 17, 22–26 (1981). 
 320. The Supreme Court has perhaps provided a preview of how they would interpret the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in its “reasonable expectation of privacy” jurisprudence. 
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court held that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he calls, because he “voluntarily” 
communicates these numbers to the telephone company when he dials them. Id. at 744. 
According to Smith’s reasoning, the only way to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
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D. Antiterrorism Searches Are Sui Generis; Courts Should Create a 
New Category of Suspicionless Searches 
Another possibility is simply to concede that antiterrorism 
searches are sui generis and create a new, narrowly tailored exception 
to the individualized suspicion rule. This rule could be designed so 
that it would apply only to searches designed to prevent terrorist 
actions, thus responding to contemporary dangers without 
unnecessarily broadening the scope of special needs searches in other 
contexts.321 As one commentator noted: “[T]he exception might 
expand to cover a variety of different search methods employed in 
new contexts as the type of weapons and the types of targets changed 
over time.”322 If the exception stood on its own doctrinal basis, none 
of these changes would affect other types of suspicionless searches.323 
This is not a trivial benefit. As one commentator points out, this 
country has conventionally recognized a “traditional criminal 
process” and an emergency criminal process.324 The former, defined as 
“investigation with the goal of proving criminal charges in an ordinary 
criminal court,”325 provides substantial rights to defendants, including 
the right to a speedy and public trial. The latter, which involves the 
military justice system as well as special military tribunals that are 
created during times of emergency, is a more flexible and efficient 
process in which “constitutional and statutory rules apply more 
leniently, [so] executive officials have discretion to craft strategies for 
the specific needs of a particular investigation or other activity.”326 
Historically, these two types of criminal processes have remained 
somewhat separate, but the government’s response to the 2001 
terrorist attacks has changed that somewhat. Today, many of the 
 
telephone numbers is to not use the telephone at all. A similar analysis applied to the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions would invariably result in findings of implied consent for almost 
every activity. 
 321. See Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches: Which Exception to the Warrant and 
Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of Mass Transit Passengers to 
Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231, 3287–91 (2006) (arguing for a sui generis 
approach to mass transit searches). 
 322. Id. at 3289. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See Parry, supra note 3, at 766 (“[T]he ‘war on terror’ has accelerated the development 
of a new criminal process and . . . this new process has increasingly displaced traditional 
methods of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing people who have engaged in conduct that 
is subject to criminal penalties . . . .”). 
 325. Id. at 791–92. 
 326. Id. at 792. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
908 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:843 
 
extraordinary actions taken by the government in response to the 
crisis posed by terrorist threats affect the traditional criminal process, 
resulting in a hybrid process in which “legally authorized discretion is 
increasingly valued as a way to respond to a steady stream of 
perceived crises.”327 In practical terms, the current war on terror has 
resulted not only in detention without charge and trial by a special 
tribunal for terrorist suspects in Guantánamo, but also in enhanced 
search and seizure powers against all citizens, including warrantless 
wiretapping of overseas telephone calls, data mining of financial 
information using national security letters, and more frequent 
detention of material witnesses.328 Although suspicionless searches are 
(for the most part) carried out by local law enforcement, they are part 
of this same trend. If these heightened powers of surveillance can be 
limited more explicitly to terrorism investigations, the incremental 
expansion of these powers to everyday investigations can be 
prevented. 
Creating a new exception would also help to shore up the 
integrity of the special needs doctrine—because preventing terrorism 
is not really a special need distinct from law enforcement, courts 
would no longer have to use terms like “administrative,” 
“regulatory,” and “law enforcement purpose” in ways that have 
nothing to do with their actual meaning. This could be a critical first 
step to bringing logic and doctrinal consistency to what is now a very 
confused jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court has even hinted that a new exception might 
be appropriate for antiterrorism searches. Edmond, in which the 
Court struck down a suspicionless roadblock designed to detect illegal 
drug trafficking, commented in dicta that “the Fourth Amendment 
would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set 
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack.”329 Although the Supreme 
Court used the word imminent, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) court later relied in part on this dictum to approve 
wiretap applications that were meant to detect terrorist activity.330 
Noting that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved of applying 
 
 327. Id. at 835. 
 328. Id. at 770–82. 
 329. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000); see also Gould & Stern, supra 
note 3, at 821–23 (analyzing the implications of this statement). 
 330. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745–46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
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the special needs doctrine in the case of “an imminent terrorist 
attack,” the FISA court argued that “[t]he nature of the ‘emergency,’ 
which is simply another word for threat, takes [antiterrorism cases] 
out of the realm of ordinary crime control.”331 
In a recent article, Judge Ronald Gould of the Ninth Circuit, 
writing with his former law clerk Simon Stern, used this language to 
support a new exception to the individualized suspicion 
requirement.332 The authors proposed broadening the special needs 
doctrine to allow any search as long as (1) the search is meant to 
“prevent catastrophic harm;” (2) the search “goes beyond routine 
police functions;” (3) the search is “as effective as is 
practical . . . [and] minimize[s] harm to the public;” (4) the officers’ 
discretion is constrained and the search is not discriminatory; and (5) 
under the totality of the circumstances, the balance favors the 
governmental interest when compared with the infringement on the 
privacy of those searched.333 
One problem with creating this new exception is evident both in 
the FISA court’s opinion and in Gould and Stern’s proposed test: 
even with a rule designed specifically for antiterrorism searches, the 
slippery slope problem still exists. This slippery slope is even apparent 
in the transition from Edmond’s dictum to the FISA court opinion: 
Edmond spoke of a search to meet an imminent threat in an 
emergency situation, but the FISA court—inexplicably equating 
“emergency” with “threat”—used this language to justify a wiretap 
when there was no evidence of an emergency or imminent harm. And 
the Gould and Stern test contains a final factor that simply asks courts 
to balance the governmental interest against the privacy 
infringement—thus providing no principled bright-line test to guide 
courts and limit the types of search that may be permitted.334 
 
 331. Id. at 746. 
 332. Gould & Stern, supra note 3, at 823. 
 333. Id. 
 334. The Gould & Stern test is only one of many proposed tests that ultimately rely on the 
reasonableness of the search. For example, Professor Edwin Butterfoss proposes a test first 
developed by Scott Sundby twenty years ago—divide searches into two categories: “initiatory 
intrusions” and “responsive intrusions.” See Butterfoss, supra note 252, at 488 (quoting Scott E. 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 
MINN. L. REV. 383, 418–21 (1988)). Responsive intrusions would be covered by the full range of 
Fourth Amendment protections whereas initiatory intrusions would be subject to a balancing 
test based on the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the level of intrusion, and the 
magnitude of the government interest. Id. at 488–95. 
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Recently, Professor Ricardo J. Bascuas proposed his own test 
that avoids the problematic “totality of the circumstances” language 
found in many of the proposed antiterrorism exceptions. In an 
attempt to set out concrete, principled guidelines for suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches, Bascuas proposes a test that permits such 
searches if: (1) they are “justified by credible, non-speculative 
evidence of . . . danger;” (2) the “danger must entail imminent 
physical injury;” and (3) “anything seized unrelated to the 
danger . . . [is] suppressed.”335 This test goes a long way toward 
providing stable guidelines for these searches, as well as preventing 
pretextual searches in which law enforcement officials conducting 
ordinary crime control claim to be deterring terrorist activity to 
bypass ordinary Fourth Amendment rules. 
But even a well-crafted, narrowly tailored exception for 
antiterrorism searches is problematic; depending on how it is 
interpreted, it is either too narrow or too broad. Bascuas’s proposal, 
for example, requires “credible, non-speculative evidence” and 
“imminent physical injury.”336 Bascuas uses these terms to distinguish 
between the vague “alarmist policy arguments” that failed to justify 
the search of protesters in Bourgeois with the concrete “sober 
evidence” produced by the N.Y.P.D. to justify the subway searches in 
MacWade.337 But what exactly constitutes credible, non-speculative 
evidence of an imminent attack? In MacWade, the government 
showed that there had been two plots to bomb the subway over the 
past eight years, and that terrorists had recently bombed the subway 
systems of three European cities.338 Although this surely demonstrates 
that subway systems are a tempting target for terrorists, does it 
 
 335. Bascuas, supra note 2, at 781. The concept of precluding any evidence found that is not 
related to the danger which justifies the search is an intriguing one. Justice Scalia suggested this 
idea at one point in the context of Terry stops, saying that it is supported by “the theory that 
half a constitutional guarantee is better than none.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If I were of the view that Terry was (insofar as the power to 
‘frisk’ is concerned) incorrectly decided, I might—even if I felt bound to adhere to that case—
vote to exclude the evidence incidentally discovered . . . .”). But ultimately this “half a 
constitutional guarantee” is insufficient in the context of antiterrorism searches because it still 
allows the government to conduct suspicionless searches and use the weapons that are 
recovered in a subsequent criminal prosecution, thus bypassing the individualized suspicion 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
 336. Bascuas, supra note 2, at 781. 
 337. Id. at 786. 
 338. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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represent credible evidence of an imminent attack? And how would a 
court apply this test to the original antiterrorism searches at airports 
and public buildings? Terrorists have targeted airplanes, and 
airplanes are particularly vulnerable to massively destructive acts of 
violence, but is there any evidence that an attack on airplanes is 
imminent? And what evidence exists to support an imminent attack 
on judges or courthouses? 
This critique is not specific to Professor Bascuas’s test; it applies 
to any attempt to create a new antiterrorist exception to the Fourth 
Amendment. Either it will only apply for a short period of time after 
a credible threat has been detected in a certain area or venue, in 
which case the search will no longer be justified once the imminence 
wears off, or it will remain in place in perpetuity, like the searches at 
airports and public courthouses, long after the concrete and imminent 
threat has subsided. The latter, of course, is far more likely.339 And in 
any case, it will still be the terrorists who control the scope of the 
exception; successful attacks against a certain type of target—or even 
foiled plots that are uncovered by law enforcement—will represent 
credible evidence that an imminent (yet never-ending) threat exists 
for that category of target nationwide. 
* * * 
This Part has considered four possible justifications for 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches: using a generalized 
reasonableness standard, relying on the legislature and the 
democratic process to set the limits of what is reasonable, applying 
the doctrine of implied consent, and creating an entirely new category 
of suspicionless searches tailored for antiterrorism cases. 
Unfortunately, none of these potential justifications are viable, which 
leads—perhaps reluctantly—to the conclusion that these searches 
should not be permissible at all. 
VI.  WHAT IF SUSPICIONLESS ANTITERRORISM SEARCHES ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
We have seen that suspicionless antiterrorism searches do not fit 
into the administrative or special needs categories to which they have 
been assigned. Because they are designed to prevent and detect 
criminal behavior, and because law enforcement uses the results of 
 
 339. See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
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these searches, it is a legal fiction to say that they serve a purpose 
other than law enforcement. Thus, only three options remain: abolish 
the special needs threshold and simply analyze these searches under a 
generalized reasonableness standard;340 create a new exception to the 
individualized suspicion requirement and tailor that exception for 
antiterrorism cases; or conclude that suspicionless antiterrorism 
searches should be unconstitutional. There are problems with the first 
two options: an unchecked slippery slope, an ominous but inexorable 
(and probably irreversible) shift in perceptions of what constitutes a 
reasonable search by the government, and ultimately allowing the 
terrorists themselves to determine the scope of Fourth Amendment 
liberties.341 In short, the first two options are essentially abandoning 
principled limitations at a time when those principles are needed the 
most. Therefore, it is at least worth asking: what if these searches 
were found to be unconstitutional? 
A. Abolishing Antiterrorism Searches 
The simplest option would be to abolish antiterrorism searches 
altogether. At first, this possibility seems unthinkable: surely no court 
today would forbid the long-standing suspicionless searches at 
airports and public courthouses. The very fact that this last option 
seems unthinkable is itself deeply troubling: in only thirty years, the 
notion of law enforcement agents subjecting individuals and their 
belongings to suspicionless searches has become not just 
constitutional and acceptable, but also thought to be indispensable. 
The searches have become a part of our way of life, a part of our 
culture, so that we have come to accept that there is no other way to 
keep us safe on airplanes or in courthouses. In this sense, it may be 
instructive to consider how “unthinkable” it was to many Americans 
when the Supreme Court desegregated public schools,342 or when the 
Supreme Court required suppression of any confession made without 
 
 340. The reasonableness test will apply even if law enforcement tries to rely on implied 
consent to justify its searches, due to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See supra notes 
311–17 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 285–307 and accompanying text. 
 342. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 394 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (“Full implementation of these 
constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems.”). 
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an informed, express waiver of a right to counsel.343 Indeed, the 
dissent in Miranda v. Arizona344 predicted that “a good many criminal 
defendants who would otherwise have been convicted . . . will now, 
under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be tried at 
all or will be acquitted.”345 Of course, nothing of the kind actually 
occurred—instead, the Court merely forced law enforcement to 
adhere to certain fundamental requirements of the right against self-
incrimination, and law enforcement officers were able to adapt their 
tactics so that defendants were still convicted at the same rate.346 
As with Miranda, the actual effect of declaring such searches 
unconstitutional might be far less severe than it first appears. Even 
without suspicionless searches, the police would be far from 
powerless to detect and apprehend potential terrorists. As Professor 
William Stuntz has pointed out, even if suspicionless searches were 
not allowed, police could use existing authority to great effect.347 
According to Stuntz, the combination of Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista348 (which held that the police could make an arrest—and 
therefore an attendant search—for any crime, regardless of how 
trivial349), and Whren v. United States350 (which held that an officer’s 
motive in conducting a search is irrelevant351) already give police 
broad powers to conduct de facto suspicionless searches in almost any 
 
 343. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (holding a criminal defendant’s 
confession to police inadmissible without a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of Fifth 
Amendment rights). 
 344. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 345. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White continued rather dramatically: 
  In some unknown number of cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or 
other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat 
his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a 
loss, in human dignity. The real concern is not the unfortunate consequences of this 
new decision on the criminal law as an abstract, disembodied series of authoritative 
proscriptions, but the impact on those who rely on the public authority for protection 
and who without it can only engage in violent self-help with guns, knives and the help 
of their neighbors similarly inclined. 
Id. 
 346. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE CONNER THOMAS, THE MIRANDA DEBATE: 
LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 56 (1998). 
 347. See Stuntz, supra note 307, at 2141. Professor Stuntz argues that the current system, 
which allows police to conduct suspicionless antiterrorism searches in some contexts and 
promises to allow them in many more as time goes on, represents a “healthy bribe” to the police 
to prevent them from engaging in more intrusive and discriminatory searches. Id. 
 348. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 349. See id. at 354. 
 350. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 351. See id. at 813. 
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context.352 When further combined with the low standard that justifies 
a Terry search and the ease with which police can elicit consent, 
police have plenty of options without resorting to suspicionless 
searches.353 
In many contexts, particularly commercial air travel, private 
companies would immediately pick up where law enforcement left 
off. Allowing airlines to screen their own passengers and luggage 
would pose no Fourth Amendment problems.354 Public law 
enforcement could focus on less intrusive methods of preventing air 
piracy, such as increased use of sky marshals. New technologies could 
be deployed that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, such as 
trace detection machines that only alert if illegal explosives are 
detected.355 
In other contexts, such as suspicionless searches at public 
buildings, the necessity argument is much weaker: is there really no 
other way of protecting court personnel than to place a security 
cordon around every government building and create a miniature 
“green zone” on the inside? Is the threat posed by terrorists (or 
ordinary criminals) so much more severe in the context of 
government buildings that extraordinary search procedures are 
justified there, as opposed to at a public school, or along a parade 
route, or at a public sporting event? 
At any rate, suspicionless searches at the entryway of public 
buildings do nothing to prevent the threat of a real terrorist attack—a 
car bomb or other large explosive being detonated outside, next to, or 
underneath the building; currently, physical impediments (such as 
bollards and setbacks from the road) prevent such crimes. 
 
 352. Stuntz, supra note 307, at 2158. 
 353. Given this existing broad authority, Stuntz argues that allowing an even greater range 
of suspicionless searches and more carefully regulating the manner in which they are carried out 
would be preferable. Id. at 2168–69. 
 354. Under the state action doctrine, the Fourth Amendment would be implicated as long as 
these searches were required by the government, as has been the case since the early 1970s. 
Thus, the government would have to abolish the requirement and allow airlines to take 
responsibility for their own passengers’ safety. Consumers may or may not find this to be a 
welcome development; private security guards may be more or less abusive—or more or less 
effective—than government personnel. 
 355. A surveillance procedure that can only detect the presence or absence of illegal activity 
is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 707 (1983) (concluding that luggage sniffing by narcotics detection dogs is not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
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Furthermore, if law enforcement personnel had any reasonable 
suspicion of a threat, they could still conduct Terry searches of that 
individual. And lastly, the criminal law itself would provide a 
powerful deterrent to any criminal activity, as it does in every other 
context—in fact, the deterrence would be even more powerful than 
usual because it is almost certain that anyone who committed a crime 
inside a courthouse or other government building would be 
apprehended, and security cameras would provide solid evidence at 
any subsequent trial. 
But most people would say these safeguards are not nearly 
enough. At airports, private security guards may not be as well 
trained as government agents, and the threat that terrorists pose to air 
traffic is a matter of national security, not to be left to the cost-benefit 
calculations of the private sector. At courthouses, there may be 
certain times when higher security is required—during the trial of a 
particularly high-profile terrorist, or after a credible threat has been 
received regarding a city or public buildings generally. And as far as 
the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction, many terrorists have 
proven themselves to be undeterrable; thus, the prospect of being 
captured and imprisoned after their crime has been committed will do 
little to prevent them from carrying out their actions. 
The special needs doctrine provides a ready solution to these 
problems: suspicionless searches could be permitted as long as the 
government is not permitted to use any fruits of the search in a 
subsequent prosecution. In other words, such a search would be 
perfectly legal—because it is justified by the special need of 
protecting public safety—so citizens could not bring any civil suits 
against government agents who conducted suspicionless searches for 
terrorists. If the government agents, however, sought to use the 
evidence recovered in the search in a subsequent prosecution, a court 
would conclude that the search was no longer a special need search, 
but rather was conducted for the purpose of crime control, and so the 
search would be unconstitutional. Thus, the searches would be 
allowed to prevent any terrorist attack from occurring, but the 
exclusionary rule would apply so that any contraband that was 
recovered would be precluded from use during any subsequent 
criminal trial. 
B. Allowing the Searches, but Precluding the Evidence 
Although at first this proposal sounds radical (not to mention 
politically unpalatable), it finds strong support in criminal procedure 
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jurisprudence. Most importantly, it comports with the legitimate 
justification for special needs searches. Originally, suspicionless 
searches were allowed only if the government agents were conducting 
the search for a purpose other than generalized crime control. This 
threshold requirement has been watered down to nonexistence over 
the decades, culminating in the rather absurd—but consistently 
repeated—assertion that preventing terrorist actions is not a law 
enforcement purpose. Not every special needs search suffered from 
this fatal weakness: some—the original administrative searches—
sought information for a legitimate regulatory purpose. Others—for 
example, the cases involving drug testing of school children or public 
employees—involved searches for unambiguously criminal activity, 
but did not use the results for criminal prosecutions.356 If the 
government did not use the results of suspicionless antiterrorist 
searches in a subsequent prosecution, these searches would fall 
squarely into the second category of special needs searches, alongside 
the drug tests of Acton, Skinner, and Von Raab.357 To carry the 
analogy with the drug testing cases one step further, under the current 
doctrine, suspicionless antiterrorist searches at airports are really the 
same as the invalidated drug tests in Ferguson, in which the public 
hospital tested pregnant mothers—supposedly to protect the health of 
the mother and fetus—and then turned the results over to law 
enforcement.358 If the fruits of the search were barred from use in 
future criminal prosecution, these searches would become more like 
those of schoolchildren in Acton and public train drivers in Skinner. 
Essentially, barring the government from using the fruits of the 
search in a subsequent prosecution would accomplish very simply 
what many courts have been trying to establish throughout the 
tortured history of antiterrorism searches: ensure that the actual 
purpose of the search is to prevent terrorist actions, rather than to 
detect, apprehend, and prosecute criminals. The court in MacWade, 
for example, concluded that the New York subway search program 
served a need other than law enforcement because the officers 
“search only those containers capable of carrying explosive devices, 
 
 356. See supra Part IV.A. 
 357. See supra Part IV.A. 
 358. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71–73 (2001); see also supra notes 242–
51 and accompanying text. 
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and they may not intentionally search for other contraband.”359 
Likewise, some of the first courts to review suspicionless airport 
searches relied on the implied consent of the suspect being searched 
as evidence that the search was narrowly tailored to prevent 
terrorism, and therefore did not serve a general crime-control 
purpose.360 But these arguments do not really show that the searches 
serve a need other than law enforcement; they merely perpetuate the 
fiction that detecting and arresting people who seek to blow up 
subway cars or airplanes is not a law enforcement purpose.361 If the 
results of a search were not used in a future criminal prosecution, 
there would be no doubt that “the essential purpose of the scheme is 
not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry 
them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to 
board at all.”362 
Another way of looking at this rule is to say that if law 
enforcement officials decide to use the fruits of the search in a 
criminal prosecution, it would create a conclusive presumption that 
the search was conducted for traditional law enforcement purposes, 
thus triggering the Fourth Amendment’s individualized suspicion 
requirements. This would create a simple solution to the problem that 
the Supreme Court created with Edmond and Ferguson: how to 
determine when a search was conducted for traditional law 
enforcement purposes. 
Adopting this rule would mean that the focus of suspicionless 
antiterrorist searches would truly be on prevention, not on 
apprehension and subsequent punishment. Of course, applying the 
exclusionary rule would make these searches less effective at 
 
 359. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 270 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 360. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973) (“To meet the test 
of reasonableness, an administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is 
consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it. It follows that airport 
screening searches are valid only if they recognize the right of a person to avoid search by 
electing not to board the aircraft. It is difficult to see how the need to prevent weapons and 
explosives from being carried aboard the plane could justify the search of a person who had 
elected not to board.” (footnotes omitted)), abrogated by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 361. Professor Bascuas makes a similar, if more sophisticated argument by proposing to 
exclude any contraband that is “unrelated to the justification for suspicionless searches.” 
Bascuas, supra note 2, at 787–88. This rule would ensure that antiterrorism searches are not 
used as pretexts for generalized crime-control searches, which is one of Bascuas’s chief 
concerns. See id. at 758–69. But it does not go far enough because it does not address the 
fundamental hypocrisy of categorizing antiterrorism searches as special needs searches. 
 362. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 908. 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
918 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:843 
 
prevention. Currently the risk of getting caught and ultimately going 
to prison is a strong deterrent to at least some potential terrorists, and 
incapacitation through incarceration can help to ensure that any 
particular criminal who gets caught will no longer be a threat for the 
time he is in prison. But many potential terrorist suspects are 
impossible to deter by any means, and so the absence of a threat of 
prison is unlikely to alter their behavior. And although they cannot be 
incapacitated through incarceration based on the recovered items, the 
government is not without options once a suspect is caught. Law 
enforcement agents could interview the suspect to learn more about 
his plans. They could begin surveillance on the suspect.363 In many 
cases, they would be able to institute deportation proceedings against 
the suspect. These options would not be as effective as using the 
results of the search in the criminal prosecution—but again, the focus 
of the suspicionless searches is by definition not bringing the suspect 
to justice; rather, it is preventing the terrorist act from occurring. 
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued in favor of this sort of rule in 
the Fifth Amendment context, pointing out that if a police officer 
wished to protect public safety, he or she was free to ignore the 
Miranda rules—but that this should not somehow render the 
compelled testimony admissible: 
  If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise 
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects 
without advising them of their constitutional rights. Such 
unconsented questioning may take place not only when police 
officers act on instinct but also when higher faculties lead them to 
believe that advising a suspect of his constitutional rights might 
decrease the likelihood that the suspect would reveal life-saving 
information.364 
Marshall acknowledged that in certain situations, this would 
mean the defendant would go free if there were no other way to 
prosecute him for the crime. But “however frequently or infrequently 
 
 363. Although the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine would prevent law enforcement 
officials from using any evidence that was discovered as a direct result of the suspicionless 
search (for example, a confession resulting from the subsequent arrest), it would not preclude 
law enforcement from beginning to monitor the public activities of the suspect and gather 
evidence of any new crimes against him. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487–88 (1963) (describing operation of the “fruit of the poisonous” tree doctrine in the context 
of illegal police actions). 
 364. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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such cases arise, their regularity is irrelevant. The Fifth Amendment 
prohibits compelled self-incrimination.”365 
Of course, the Court rejected Justice Marshall’s argument in the 
Fifth Amendment context, creating a public safety exception to the 
Miranda rule.366 Yet the Supreme Court has confirmed that—outside 
the public safety context—law enforcement officers are faced with a 
choice: they are free to ignore Miranda as long as they do not use any 
subsequent statements at a criminal trial.367 Allowing suspicionless 
antiterrorism searches but precluding the evidence from trial would 
give the officers the same choice. 
Many would argue that the analogy with Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence is fallacious. The Fifth Amendment precludes 
compelled self-incrimination, which naturally leads courts to conclude 
that the Amendment does not apply if the statements are not used in 
a criminal case.368 The Fourth Amendment’s text is much broader; it 
precludes all “unreasonable searches,” regardless of how the 
government uses these searches. And the Supreme Court has said 
numerous times that the Fourth Amendment applies with equal force 
to civil and criminal cases, whether or not the evidence is used in a 
subsequent trial.369 
 
 365. Id. at 687. 
 366. Id. at 657–58 (majority opinion). The Court employed reasoning quite similar to what is 
used to justify suspicionless antiterrorism searches in the Fourth Amendment context, id., 
noting that “we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be 
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted 
by a concern for the public safety,” id. at 658 n.7. 
 367. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003) (reasoning that Fifth 
Amendment rights are not implicated when statements by a subject of a police investigation are 
not admitted in a criminal proceeding). Just as with suspicionless antiterrorism searches, the 
courts seem unwilling to apply this doctrine when there is a vague risk to public safety—even 
though the existence of a danger to public safety has no bearing on whether or not a statement 
is the result of a coercive interrogation. See Parry, supra note 3, at 816–18 (noting that 
“interrogation issues . . . are litigated along two tracks,” and using this as an example of how a 
“new criminal process”—more like war and less like crime control—“restricts the space in 
which constitutional rights operate to the courtroom alone”). 
 368. The Fifth Amendment is also distinct from the Fourth Amendment in that the former 
provides a right and a remedy together—effectively stating that compelled testimony is 
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. The Fourth Amendment provides a right but no remedy, 
which has led to courts creating the exclusionary rule. 
 369. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“But we cannot agree that 
the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely ‘peripheral.’ It is 
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the 
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” (quoting Frank 
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959), overruled by Camara, 387 U.S. 523)). 
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But the special needs doctrine itself is proof that this is not in fact 
how the Fourth Amendment has been applied: if evidence that is 
found as a result of a search is not used for a criminal prosecution, the 
Court is willing to suspend the individualized suspicion requirement. 
As it turns out, this is a perfectly sensible distinction. Shifting the 
focus from the purpose of the search to the use of the results helps to 
resolve a glaring inconsistency in Fourth Amendment law. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that judges should not 
delve into the subjective intentions of law enforcement officers who 
conduct a search370—yet the purpose of the search is a critical issue in 
deciding whether the special needs doctrine applies. If the fruits of 
the search are never used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, it is 
easy to determine that the purpose of the search was other than law 
enforcement. But otherwise it is almost impossible to distinguish 
between the purpose of the search (the determinative question in 
special needs cases) and the subjective intentions of those who 
conduct the search (an improper inquiry under current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
One commentator tries to resolve this inconsistency by 
distinguishing between the “motive” of a search and the “fringe 
benefits” of the search,371 or by inquiring whether or not crime control 
was the “causative or substantive factor” in the decision to conduct 
the search.372 The Supreme Court itself in Ferguson tried to draw a 
distinction between the immediate purpose of the search and the 
ultimate purpose of the search—or whether law enforcement was a 
means to an end or a happy side effect of the search.373 But none of 
this matters to the suspect who is being searched; his reasonable 
expectation of privacy is being infringed upon to the same degree 
regardless of the motive of the search. 
In other words, one should pay less attention to why the search 
was conducted—which requires courts to delve into the mind of the 
police officers or police officials, and probably has multiple 
 
 370. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (declining to analyze the 
subjective intent of police officers in the context of the Fourth Amendment). 
 371. Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes and 
Crime Control Agenda, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 305 (2006). 
 372. Id. at 309. 
 373. See supra notes 242–51 and accompanying text. 
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answers374—and instead focus on how the results of the search are 
used once they are acquired: are they used as evidence in a criminal 
prosecution or merely to establish regulatory violations, maintain 
school discipline, or prevent a bomb from coming on board an 
airplane? This distinction is logical: an individual who is being 
searched by a law enforcement officer does not care why the officer is 
searching him—a checkpoint and visual search of a car pursuant to a 
drunk-driving checkpoint375 is just as intrusive as a checkpoint and 
visual search of a car by officers looking for information on a recent 
hit and run.376 But a subject is likely to care quite a bit about whether 
the results of the search will later be used in a criminal prosecution 
against him. 
In short, one of the primary reasons for limiting the power of the 
state when it conducts searches is the state’s ability to use the fruits of 
the search to prosecute individuals. What the special needs cases 
indicate is that these searches become less intrusive—and thus 
possibly constitutional—if the law enforcement agent does not use 
the results of the search in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
C. Responding to Potential Criticisms 
A rule allowing suspicionless antiterrorism searches would find 
plenty of opposition on both ends of the political spectrum. To 
conservatives, the idea that a police officer could apprehend a 
criminal attempting to blow up an airplane or shoot a judge and then 
not be allowed to use the recovered evidence against the criminal 
might seem ludicrous. But of course this is already the law in every 
other Fourth Amendment context: if law enforcement officers search 
someone without any individualized suspicion and recover 
contraband of any kind, the exclusionary rule precludes the 
contraband from being used in court. There is no reason why certain 
crimes should be exempt from the exclusionary rule, however serious 
they may be. Of course, the exclusionary rule itself has been the 
 
 374. Of course, it is somewhat easier to determine the purpose of a search if courts look to 
the programmatic purpose of the search, as opposed to the individual motive of the officer 
conducting the search, but by either definition any given search would probably have multiple 
purposes. 
 375. See supra notes 234–41 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 241. Compare City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) 
(holding the Indianapolis drunk driving checkpoint system unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment), with Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004) (upholding the 
constitutionality of police checkpoints used to ask motorists about a hit-and-run incident). 
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subject of a significant amount of criticism,377 but for the moment it 
remains the centerpiece of enforcement for criminal procedure 
violations, and so in a sense this Article merely proposes that the rule 
should be applied to every search, regardless of the type of crime 
being investigated.378 
Liberals, meanwhile, might worry about abuse on the part of law 
enforcement: if police no longer need to worry about violating the 
Fourth Amendment, what will prevent them from conducting overly 
intrusive searches when searching for terrorists?379 One response to 
this concern is to take a realistic look at the state of the suspicionless 
search doctrine. Many courts have held that antiterrorism searches 
meet the regulatory purpose of protecting public safety. And most 
courts that have rejected the special needs test for antiterrorism 
searches (such as Johnston or Seglen) are willing to change their 
minds if there is credible evidence of a terrorist threat—thus opening 
the door to widespread, indiscriminate suspicionless searches in the 
name of preventing terrorism. The only other check under current 
law on the government’s ability to conduct such searches is that they 
must be reasonable—and as this Article demonstrates, this is at best 
an unpredictable test, with the government more and more likely to 
win as the terrorist threat (or the perceived terrorist threat) increases. 
Thus, under current law the government does not face many obstacles 
in creating suspicionless antiterrorism searches—and if the 
government agents overstep their bounds and conduct a search that is 
unreasonable, the usual remedy is simply that the evidence cannot be 
used in court—which would be no different from the result under the 
proposed rule.380 
 
 377. See H. Mitchell Caldwell, Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: Can One Trial Judge in One 
County in One State Nudge a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule?, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1, 1–2 
(surveying criticism of the exclusionary rule). See generally Amar, supra note 33, at 785–800 
(critiquing the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of constitutional rights). 
 378. Even if the exclusionary rule is eventually abolished by the Supreme Court, the 
rationale for excluding contraband recovered in special needs searches remains because the 
search can only be honestly termed “special needs” if the results of the search are not used 
against the suspect in a criminal trial. 
 379. Judge Friendly, for example, warned against unbridled searches if police were no 
longer concerned with the Fourth Amendment. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 949 (1965) (analyzing the relationship of the 
exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment). 
 380. It is true, of course, that individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated have 
the right to bring a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Torbet v. United Airlines, 
298 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (presenting factual background for a statutory claim of a 
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Another response to those worried about overly intrusive 
searches is that even if the Fourth Amendment allowed 
indiscriminate suspicionless antiterrorism searches, the Due Process 
Clause would still apply to limit the search method used by the police 
and prevent abuses of this power.381 There is a long history of case law 
that defines the due process limits of police activity, leading to a well-
established test: police activity that is “so brutal and so offensive to 
human dignity” that it “shocks the conscience” violates an 
individual’s due process rights.382 If an antiterrorism search was so 
extremely abusive that it met this high standard, the subject of the 
search would be able to recover damages from the law enforcement 
officer.383 
For example, a brief pat-down search of every person who enters 
the subway system at a certain station could be termed a special needs 
search. As long as the police do not seek to use any contraband 
 
Fourth Amendment rights violation). These lawsuits are rare, however, and are not the primary 
mechanism for enforcing the Fourth Amendment. 
 381. As noted above, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence already has a similar two-tier system: 
if the government agents want to use an individual’s statements against him in a criminal trial, it 
must comply with Miranda and all the other Fifth Amendment requirements. If it has no 
intention of using the information at trial, it need not comply with Miranda—but it is not 
completely unregulated. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) (“Our views on 
the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that police 
torture or other abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally permissible so long as the 
statements are not used at trial; it simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry 
in those cases and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.”). 
 382. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952); see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 
U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (holding that a blood test taken from a criminal defendant does not “shock 
the conscience”). It is true that the Supreme Court has said that if police action is covered by 
the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause will not apply to the search. See, e.g., Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental 
conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must 
be the guide for analyzing these claims.”). A search that is truly a special needs search (in that 
the fruits of the search are not used in a subsequent prosecution), however, could be considered 
to be outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment and therefore covered by the Due Process 
Clause. 
 383. If this standard is too low, or if the threat of civil lawsuits is so weak that it is 
insufficient to deter abusive police behavior, there is nothing preventing cities, states, or the 
federal government from passing legislation to raise the standards, or make lawsuits easier to 
file, or to prohibit certain specific egregious practices. See generally Parry, supra note 3, at 819–
20 (discussing potential legislative or judicial responses to illegal police actions). Here is one 
place in which political process theory would predict intervention by the legislature, especially if 
the abusive practices were used during widespread, indiscriminate suspicionless searches (and if 
they were not, the subjects of the search could conceivably file an equal protection claim). 
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recovered in such a search in a subsequent criminal trial, the search 
would not violate the Fourth Amendment. And because the pat-down 
search did not shock the conscience, it would not violate the Due 
Process Clause, and thus would not subject the police officer to any 
civil liability. 
If the police officers, however, sought to use the recovered 
evidence in a subsequent criminal trial, the search would no longer be 
considered a special needs search and would violate the Fourth 
Amendment (leading to exclusion of the evidence and potential civil 
liability against the officer). And if the police conducted a blatantly 
overintrusive search—say, conducting a suspicionless strip search of 
some of the passengers—a court could find that the search shocked 
the conscience and violated the Due Process Clause, thus opening up 
the officer to civil liability. 
But of course fear of civil judgments would not be the real check 
on police behavior. Just as under current law, the exclusionary rule 
would provide a strong incentive for police officers to find some other 
way to conduct the search that would allow them to use the evidence 
in court. 
Essentially, this proposal would give law enforcement officers a 
choice: if their true goal was to prevent an armed criminal from 
boarding a plane—or boarding a subway, or entering a public 
courthouse, or entering a sports arena, or attending a protest, or 
driving near a dam—they could set up a suspicionless search program 
to detect any explosives or other weapons, ensuring that such 
contraband is confiscated and the terrorist act is prevented. If their 
goal is to apprehend the armed criminal and bring him to trial—in 
other words, if they have a criminal law purpose—they would need to 
design a search regime that comported with the usual Fourth 
Amendment requirements, which would include some form of 
individualized suspicion. 
Thus, the rule would have several benefits. First, it would give 
law enforcement the flexibility to decide which priority is more 
important for the given context. If there is a credible threat that must 
be responded to regarding, say, a specific trial or protest, law 
enforcement officers could develop a suspicionless search regime, 
emphasizing prevention at all costs and abandoning their crime 
detection function. But in the absence of a credible threat, law 
enforcement officers would decide to revert to legitimate surveillance 
procedures, the results of which could be used in court. The decision 
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of which type of search to use would be made by the individuals in the 
best position to make such a decision: law enforcement officers 
themselves. And unlike the searches at airports and courthouses—
which became legally and thus culturally entrenched, and are now 
permanently part of American life—intrusive security procedures 
that are put into place because of the increased threat would only be 
temporary, until the specific, credible threat receded and the police 
decided to shift priorities to attempt to apprehend and prosecute 
perpetrators. 
Second, the rule would give law enforcement more powers to 
search if it were truly intending only to prevent a terrorist attack. 
They would no longer have to worry about whether their actions 
complied with the inconsistent and ever-changing case law in this 
area, and they would no longer have to prove that they had a specific 
and concrete threat (and they would no longer need to guess about 
what a judge might think that term means). But the ban on using the 
fruits of these searches would be an automatic check against police 
frequently resorting to overly intrusive techniques: the fact that the 
contraband that is recovered cannot be used in subsequent criminal 
proceedings would provide a strong incentive for law enforcement to 
conduct this type of search sparingly. And, as discussed above, the 
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause would still apply, 
precluding any discriminatory or extraordinarily intrusive searches. 
Finally, this rule would provide police with a strong incentive to 
develop more effective but less intrusive methods of antiterrorism 
surveillance, such as machines that could detect the presence of 
explosives or firearms without revealing any other information about 
the suspect and without subjecting him to a physical search.384 As 
noted above, banning suspicionless searches entirely would provide 
an even stronger incentive, but would also compromise security in 
those situations in which there is a real threat of a terrorist attack. 
 
 384. These types of searches are known as binary searches because they are designed to only 
tell a law enforcement officer whether or not illegal conduct is occurring, without other 
information about the suspect—essentially producing an output of either “yes” or “no.” 
Examples of binary searches currently in widespread use by law enforcement are drug-sniffing 
dogs and narcotics field tests. These searches do not implicate the Fourth Amendment under 
the Katz standard because they do not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that an inspection by a narcotics dog trained to 
sniff contraband without opening passengers’ luggage does not violate the passengers’ Fourth 
Amendment rights). For a further discussion of the legality of binary searches, see Ric 
Simmons, Technology-Enhanced Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURVEY AM. L. 711, 718–19 (2005). 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
926 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:843 
 
This rule still encourages creativity and innovation in developing less 
intrusive surveillance tools and procedures, but would ensure that law 
enforcement could still provide protection when necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
When antiterrorism searches first began, they no doubt seemed 
reasonable to the public and to the courts. In the late 1960s, air piracy 
and domestic terrorism were seen as real threats to the United States’ 
security, and law enforcement seemed powerless to combat these 
threats through ordinary means. Instituting a regime of blanket 
suspicionless searches was the only effective solution—and the 
searches were indeed effective. Once the problem was solved, why 
would anyone want to dismantle the search regimes and revive the 
old dangers and risks? 
Likewise, the administrative search doctrine began innocently 
enough. Health inspectors had an important job to do, and they could 
not do it effectively if they needed to generate individualized 
suspicion before conducting their inspections. And because their 
inspections were far removed from the harm the Fourth Amendment 
was meant to prevent, allowing suspicionless searches for purely 
regulatory purposes seemed harmless—a thoughtful compromise 
based on the reasonableness language in the Fourth Amendment. 
But in both instances, this Article demonstrates that these 
reasonable compromises have grown into an inconsistent tangle of 
case law, justified by a broad Fourth Amendment loophole whose 
premise—that detecting and preventing violent crime is not a law 
enforcement purpose—borders on the absurd. It is long past time to 
restore logic and principle to this area of the law, and the new wave of 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches presents courts with the perfect 
opportunity to do so. Precedent already exists in the special needs 
doctrine—numerous drug testing cases such as Acton and Von Raab 
look to how the fruits of the search are utilized as part of the test to 
determine whether the search was conducted for a law enforcement 
purpose. The obstacles are the thirty-five-year-old precedents, 
which—against all logic—held that searching airline passengers and 
courthouse visitors for weapons was a regulatory function. 
These obstacles are all the more daunting because the searches 
that they affirm are now a generally accepted—and even welcome—
part of everyday life. But if they are left undisturbed, the government 
SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2010  2:12:49 AM 
2010] SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS 927 
will continue using them to justify antiterrorism suspicionless searches 
in dozens of other contexts, and courts will be forced to approve of 
them all or to manufacture artificial distinctions between cases, 
creating an inconsistency and unpredictability that will inevitably 
leach into other special needs cases. By excluding the fruits of these 
searches from future criminal prosecutions, the courts will provide a 
simple, principled distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
suspicionless searches—and their claims that these searches fulfill a 
special need other than law enforcement will actually be true. 
